編者按：近期，在印度與巴基斯坦空軍交火中，巴基斯坦聲稱其使用中國制造的殲-10戰斗機擊落了印度的陣風戰機，事件引發國際社會廣泛關注。 清華大學戰略與安全研究中心研究員周波就此在《南華早報》發表評論文章，從國防工業的里程碑、國際軍火市場的機遇、解放軍戰略信心的提升，以及核武庫擴充的必要性四個方面分析了這一事件的戰略意義。文章指出，這一事件不僅展示了中國武器系統的實戰能力，也為中國在全球軍事與地緣政治格局中贏得更大影響力提供了契機。 北京對話與觀察者網翻譯發布中文，以饗讀者。

【文/觀察者網專欄作者 周波，翻譯/ 王凡非】

這是中國的又一個“DeepSeek時刻”。到現在，全世界都已聽說巴基斯坦空軍如何使用中國制造的殲-10戰斗機發射中國制造的PL-15導彈，擊落了印度裝備的最先進作戰飛機——法國制造的陣風戰斗機。

中國能從中汲取哪些啟示？首先，這是中國國防工業的一個里程碑。這是中國最先進的武器第一次真正有機會證明其可靠性和致命威力。中國已有四十多年未卷入戰爭。發展是和平的最大紅利，中國在自力更生與創新方面的漫長積累終于開花結果。

1991年的海灣戰爭對中國來說是一記警鐘，美國主導的聯軍對伊拉克的進攻讓中國看清了現代戰爭的作戰方式，也讓解放軍認識到自己的不足。曾經深受蘇聯體系影響的中國國防工業，如今已能自主研發高科技的尖端武器。

據報道，中國在研發和測試軌道轟炸系統方面處于領先地位，該系統使用低地球軌道上的高超音速滑翔飛行器來打擊目標。中國不是擁有一款，而是兩款第六代隱形戰斗機，這是由兩家不同中國公司研發的先進型號。

空戰盡管發生在巴基斯坦與印度武裝部隊之間，但它也是中國與西方武器系統之間首次交鋒的開端。

誠然，殲-10戰斗機的成功并不意味著它總能勝過法國陣風。兩者均為4.5代戰機，空戰也是雷達系統與導彈制導的較量。但殲-10甚至不是中國空軍中最先進的戰機——例如，還有第五代戰機殲-20，同樣由成都飛機公司制造，報道稱其年產量高達100架。

巴基斯坦空軍殲-10CE戰機

其次，經巴基斯坦實戰展示后，未來國際軍火市場將由美國和中國兩大供應商主導。美國在2020至2024年間占據43%的市場份額，未來幾十年仍將是最大出口國，部分原因是盟友及某些伙伴會基于政治考量而購買美國武器。

中國在斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所的排名中位列第四，占全球武器出口的5.9%，落后于美國、法國和俄羅斯，過去主要出口坦克、火炮和小型武器等低端產品。近三分之二的中國武器出口流向巴基斯坦。但此次史無前例的“廣告”后，中國各類精良、高性價比的武器將廣受歡迎。

中國可能吸引中東和北非的買家，如阿爾及利亞、埃及、伊拉克和蘇丹，這些國家通常無法獲取最尖端的西方技術。中國還可能在東南亞和拉丁美洲開拓市場。

正如俄烏沖突削弱了對俄制武器的需求——相比戰爭爆發的2022年，去年俄羅斯的武器出口驟降了47%——印巴沖突也可能會削弱非美制西方武器的吸引力。一位俄羅斯學者曾告訴我，俄羅斯或許有一天會請求中國向其出售武器。對此，我并不感到意外。

第三，中國武器系統在實戰中的成功將增強解放軍在潛在對抗中的信心和戰略地位。近年來，澳大利亞和加拿大等國派出飛機和軍艦接近中國沿海，挑戰中國的主權主張。即使這些挑釁僅具象征意義，如今也可能會減少。中國海軍今年2月在澳大利亞海岸附近進行實彈演習，已向澳大利亞傳達了一個信息：解放軍也可以以牙還牙。

中國海軍軍艦航跡圖，資料來源：澳大利亞國防部

解放軍在臺灣海峽和南海的演習將更加頻繁，科目演練更趨復雜。這將迫使美國在任何軍事干預前三思而行。

正如最新的關稅對抗所顯示的那樣，中國是唯一有膽識和實力對抗美國的國家。美國在臺灣防衛問題上采取的“戰略模糊”政策，如今看起來更像是為美軍無法在中國本土贏得勝利所遮掩的一塊遮羞布。

第四，盡管中國在常規武器方面進展迅速，但仍應增加其核武庫。鑒于印巴沖突是一場常規戰爭，這一結論或許出人意料。然而，正因為兩國在核彈頭數量上勢均力敵——印度被認為擁有172枚，巴基斯坦擁有170枚——才促成了他們之間迅速達成（盡管脆弱的）停火。這種力量對比使雙方都無法承受沖突升級為核戰爭的代價。

五角大樓估計中國有600枚核彈頭。美國的核彈頭數量據信接近中國的十倍。如果中國僅維持這一數量，難道不會讓美國在臺海危機中膽大妄為到首先動用核武器嗎？畢竟，一些美國智庫已經提出過這種可能性。

中國從俄烏沖突中汲取的一個教訓是，俄羅斯的核武庫有效阻止了北約直接介入沖突。對中國而言，技術能力和資金投入都不是主要問題，關鍵在于是否作出政治決策。擁有更多核武器并不會削弱中國“不首先使用”核政策，但在沖突不可避免時，這將為中國在家門口爭取勝利提供更有力的保障。

（翻頁查看英文原文）

This is another “DeepSeek moment” for China. By now, the world will have heard of how the Pakistan Air Force used Chinese-made J-10 fighter jets with Chinese-made PL-15 missiles to shoot down India’s French-made Rafale fighter jets, its best enlisted combat aircraft.

What lessons might Beijing draw? First, this is a milestone for China’s defence industry. Until now, China’s state-of-the-art weapons have had no real chance of proving their reliability or lethal power. China has not been at war in more than four decades. Development has been the largest dividend of peace and China’s long march of self-reliance and innovation is producing results.

The 1991 Gulf War was a wake-up call for China to modernise the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The US-led coalition’s attack on Iraq showed China what a modern war looked like – and how inadequately prepared the PLA was. Chinese defence, heavily influenced in its early years by Russian systems, has now become a hi-tech modern force developing sophisticated weapons of its own.

China reportedly leads in developing and testing a fractional orbital bombardment system that uses a hypersonic glide vehicle on a low-Earth orbit to reach its target. It also reportedly has not one but two sixth-generation stealth fighters, advanced models that two different Chinese companies have come up with.

The aerial fight may have been between the armed forces of Pakistan and India, but it was also the first round of a duel between Chinese and Western weapon systems.

True, the reported success of the J-10 fighter jet does not necessarily mean it will always prevail over the French Rafale. Both are 4.5-generation aircraft and an aerial fight is also a contest between radar systems and missile guidance. But the J-10 is not even the best aircraft in China’s air force – for one, there is also the 5th-generation J-20, also manufactured by the Chengdu Aircraft Company, which is reportedly pushing them out at a rate of 100 a year.

Secondly, after the display in Pakistan, the international arms market will come to be dominated by just two suppliers: the US – and China. The United States, which commanded 43 per cent of the market from 2020-2024, will remain the biggest exporter for decades, in part because allies and some partners buy American arms for political reasons.

China, which came fourth on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute list with 5.9 per cent of global arms exports – after the US, France and Russia – used to sell low-end products such as tanks, artillery and small arms. Nearly two-thirds of China’s arms exports go to Pakistan. But after this unprecedented advertisement, Chinese arms of all types, with their sophistication and affordability, will become more popular.

China could be approached by buyers in the Middle East and North Africa such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq and Sudan, states that typically cannot access the most cutting-edge Western technology. It may also find markets in Southeast Asia and Latin America.

Just as the Ukraine war hurt demand for Russian weapons – exports plummeted by 47 per cent last year compared to 2022 when the war began – so the India-Pakistan conflict is likely to reduce the appeal of non-US weapons from the West. One Russian scholar told me Moscow may well ask Beijing to sell it arms one day; I was not really surprised.

Thirdly, the combat success of Chinese weapons systems will enhance the PLA’s confidence and strategic position in a potential showdown. In recent years, countries such as Australia and Canada have sent aircraft and ships near the Chinese coast to challenge China’s claims. Such provocations, even if merely symbolic, may now decrease. The Chinese navy’s live firing exercise off Australia’s coast in February told Canberra the PLA could do the same in return.

PLA exercises in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea will become more often and more sophisticated in rehearsing scenarios. It will make the US think twice about any military intervention.

As the latest tariff showdown demonstrates, China is the only county with the guts and heft to push back against the US.

Washington’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” over the defence of Taiwan now seems more like a fig leaf fo a US military unable to guarantee a win on Chinese home turf.

Fourthly, China should increase its nuclear stockpile even if it is making swift advances in conventional weapons. This might be an unexpected conclusion given the India-Pakistan conflict is a conventional one. But their swift truce – if fragile – is also precisely because the two nuclear powers are evenly matched in terms of warheads: India is thought to have 172 to Pakistan’s 170, and neither can afford for their conflict to escalate into a nuclear war.

Should China maintain its nuclear arsenal of 600 warheads, as estimated by the Pentagon, might it not embolden the US, which is thought to have nearly 10 times as many warheads, to think about using nuclear bombs first in a Taiwan Strait crisis, as some American think tanks have suggested?

One lesson China has learned from the Ukraine war is that Russia’s nuclear stockpile deters Nato from directly involving the transatlantic security alliance in the conflict. For Beijing, neither technical know-how nor financial investment is a big problem. It is more a question of making a political decision. Having more nuclear weapons won’t compromise China’s no-first-use policy – but it would give China a better chance of a win at its doorstep should a conflict become inevitable.

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