編者按

霍華德·馬克斯，橡樹資本聯合創始人，著有《周期》、《投資最重要的事》。他從上世紀90年代開始撰寫的備忘錄深受華爾街歡迎，也被他的好朋友、投資大師巴菲特先生所推崇。

在新年的這篇備忘錄中，馬克斯回應了“美股有泡沫嗎？”，也回顧了25年前的互聯網科技泡沫，他說：

• 重要的不是你買了什么，而是你付出了什么價格。

• 好的投資不在于買好的東西，而在于買得好。

• 不存在一種好到價格從來都不存在“高估”風險的資產，也鮮有一種壞到價格從來都不存在“低估”機會的資產。

這些觀點，歷久彌新，下面為大家轉載備忘錄原文。

On Bubble Watch

再議泡沫

霍華德·馬克斯

Exactly 25 years ago today, I published the first memo that brought a response from readers (after having written for almost ten years without receiving any). The memo was called bubble.com, and the subject was the irrational behavior I thought was taking place with respect to tech, internet, and e-commerce stocks. The memo had two things going for it: it was right, and it was right fast. One of the first great investment adages I learned in the early 1970s is that “being too far ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong.” In this case, however, I wasn’t too far ahead.

就在25年前的今天，我發表的備忘錄第一次收到了讀者回復（在此之前我已寫了將近10年的備忘錄，但從未收到任何回復）。那篇備忘錄名為《網絡科技泡沫》，主題是我認為在科技股、互聯網股和電子商務股中正在發生的非理性的投資行為。該備忘錄有兩個可圈可點之處：它說對了，而且很快得到了印證。我在1970年代初學到的首個偉大投資格言之一是“過于超前與做錯，兩者很難區分”。就這篇備忘錄而言，顯然我并非太過超前。

This milestone anniversary gives me an occasion to write again about bubbles, a subject that’s very much of interest today. Some of what I write here will be familiar to anyone who read my December memo about the macro picture. But that memo only went to Oaktree clients, so I’m going to recycle here the part of its content that relates to the subject of bubbles.

這個里程碑式的周年紀念日再次勾起我探討泡沫的想法，而今，泡沫是一個非常吸睛的主題。讀過我12月份關于宏觀形勢的備忘錄的人應該對我在這里寫的一些內容不會陌生。但那份備忘錄只發給了橡樹資本的客戶，所以我在這里重復一下其中與泡沫話題相關的部分內容。

Since I’m a credit investor, having stopped analyzing stocks nearly five decades ago, and since I’ve never ventured far into the world of technology, I’m certainly not going to say much about today’s hot companies and their stocks. All of my observations will be generalities, but I’m hopeful they’ll be relevant nonetheless.

眾所周知我是一名信用投資者，五十年前開始就不再涉獵股票分析，也未曾對科技領域有過深入研究，因此我也不會對如今的熱門公司及其股票品頭論足。我所有的觀察或許都是泛泛而談，但我仍希望這些觀察具有一定相關性。

In this century’s first decade, investors had the opportunity to participate in – and lose money due to – two spectacular bubbles. The first was the tech-media-telecom (“TMT”) bubble of the late ’90s, which began to burst in mid-2000, and the second was the housing bubble of the mid-aughts, which gave rise to (a) extending mortgages to sub-prime borrowers who couldn’t or wouldn’t document income or assets, (b) the structuring of those loans into levered, tranched mortgage-backed securities, and consequently (c) massive losses for investors in those securities, especially the financial institutions that had created them and retained some. As a result of those experiences, many people these days are on heightened alert for bubbles, and I’m often asked whether there’s a bubble surrounding the Standard & Poor’s 500 and the handful of stocks that have been leading it.

在二十一世紀頭十年，投資者有機會參與，甚至因此蒙受損失，兩個巨大的泡沫。第一個是二十世紀90年代末興起并在千禧年年中破裂的科技、媒體及電信（“TMT”）泡沫；第二個在這段時期中間點產生的房地產泡沫。它導致了：(1)向無法或不愿提供收入或資產證明的次級借款人發放房地產抵押貸款；(2)將這些貸款證券化為含有杠桿的、分層抵押支持證券，并最終導致(3)該類證券投資者，特別是創造了這些證券并持有其中部分的金融機構，蒙受了重大損失。顧及這些經歷，如今許多人都對泡沫高度警惕。我就經常被問到，標準普爾500股票指數和少數幾只領漲的股票是否存在泡沫。

The seven top stocks in the S&P 500 – the so-called “Magnificent Seven” – are Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google’s parent), Amazon.com, Nvidia, Meta (owner of Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram), and Tesla. I’m sure I don’t have to go into detail regarding the performance of these stocks; everyone’s aware of the phenomenon. Suffice it to say that a small number of stocks have dominated the S&P 500 in recent years and have been responsible for a highly disproportionate share of its gains. A chart from Michael Cembalest, chief strategist at J.P. Morgan Asset Management, shows that:

標普500的七大個股——即所謂的“美股七雄（“Magnificent Seven”）”——分別為蘋果、微軟、Alphabet（谷歌的母公司）、亞馬遜、英偉達、Meta（Facebook、WhatsApp和Instagram的所有者）和特斯拉。這些股票的表現有目共睹，無需我多言。概括來說，在過去幾年里少數幾只股票主導了標普500的走勢，并在其漲幅中占據極高的比例。摩根資產管理首席策略師Michael Cembalest的一張圖表顯示：

• the market capitalization of the seven largest components of the S&P 500 represented 32-33% of the index’s total capitalization at the end of October;

  截至2024年10月底，標普500七大成分股的市值占該指數總市值的32-33%；

• that percentage is roughly double the leaders’ share five years ago; and

  該比例約為五年前龍頭股占比的兩倍；以及

• prior to the emergence of the “Magnificent Seven,” the highest share for the top seven stocks in the last 28 years was roughly 22% in 2000, at the height of the TMT bubble.

  在“美股七雄”興起之前，過去28年中前七大個股的最高占比是2000年正值TMT泡沫高潮時的約22%。

It’s also important to note that at the end of November, U.S. stocks represented over 70% of the MSCI World Index, the highest percentage since 1970 according to another Cembalest chart. Thus, it’s clear that (a) U.S. companies are worth a lot compared to the companies in other regions and (b) the top seven U.S. stocks are worth a heightened amount relative to the rest of U.S. stocks.But is it a bubble?

同樣值得注意的是，根據Michael Cembalest的另一張圖表，截至2024年11月底，美國股票在MSCI世界指數中所占比重超過70%，為自1970年以來的最高水平。因此，明顯可見(1)與其他地區的公司相比，美國公司的價值很高；及(2)前七大美股的市值高于其余美股。但這就是泡沫嗎？

01

What Is a Bubble?

何謂泡沫？

Investment lingo comes and goes. My young Oaktree colleagues use a lot of terms these days for which I have to request translation. But “bubble” and “crash” have been in the financial lexicon for as long as I’ve been in the investment business, and I imagine they’ll remain there for generations to come. Today, the mainstream media uses them broadly, and people seem to consider them to be subject to objective definition.But for me, a bubble or crash is more a state of mind than a quantitative calculation.

投資術語日新月異。如今橡樹資本的年輕同事使用了很多我也需借助“翻譯”才能理解的投資術語。但是，自從我投身投資事業以來，“泡沫”和“崩盤”這兩個金融詞匯就一直如影隨形，我想在未來的幾代人中它們也會一直存在。如今，主流媒體廣泛使用它們，人們似乎認為它們可以被客觀地定義。但在我看來，泡沫或崩盤與其說是一種量化計算，不如說是一種心理狀態。

In my view, a bubble not only reflects a rapid rise in stock prices, but it is a temporary mania characterized by – or, perhaps better, resulting from – the following:

我認為，泡沫不僅反映股價的快速上漲，而且是一種具有以下特征的暫時性狂熱，或者更貼切的說，是由以下原因引起的暫時性狂熱：

• highly irrational exuberance (to borrow a term from former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan),

  高度非理性繁榮（借用前美聯儲主席艾倫·格林斯潘的話），

• outright adoration of the subject companies or assets, and a belief that they can’t miss,

  對標的公司或資產的徹底崇拜，以及篤信不能錯過，

• massive fear of being left behind if one fails to participate (‘‘FOMO’’), and

  踏空的巨大恐懼（“FOMO，錯失恐懼癥”），以及

• resulting conviction that, for these stocks, “there’s no price too high.”

  因而確信這些股票“價格再高也不為過”。

“No price too high” stands out to me in particular.When you can’t imagine any flaws in the argument and are terrified that your officemate/golf partner/brother-in-law/competitor will own the asset in question and you won’t, it’s hard to conclude there’s a price at which you shouldn’t buy. (As Charles Kindleberger and Robert Aliber observed in the fifth edition of Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, “there is nothing so disturbing to one’s well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich.”)

“價格再高也不為過”尤其讓我印象深刻。當你無法想象論據中的任何缺陷，并害怕你的同事/高爾夫球伴/姐夫/競爭對手將持有你并不持有的資產時，你就很難得出結論說你不應該以某個價格購買。正如查爾斯·金德爾伯格和羅伯特·阿利伯在《瘋狂、驚恐和崩潰——金融危機史》（第五版）中所指出，“沒有比看到自己的朋友變有錢，更能影響思考與判斷的”。

So, to discern a bubble, you can look at valuation parameters, but I’ve long believed a psychological diagnosis is more effective. Whenever I hear “there’s no price too high” or one of its variants – a more disciplined investor might say, “of course there’s a price that’s too high, but we’re not there yet” – I consider it a sure sign that a bubble is brewing.

所以，要辨別泡沫，投資者雖然可以觀察估值參數，但我一直認為心理診斷更為有效。每當我聽到“價格再高也不為過”或類似說法（更嚴謹的投資者可能會說：“當然會有價格過高的時候，但我們還沒到那一步”）時，我就認為這是泡沫正在醞釀的明確信號。

Roughly fifty years ago, an elder gave me the gift of one of my favorite maxims. I’ve written about it several times in my memos, but in my opinion, I can’t do so often enough. It’s “the three stages of the bull market”:

大約五十年前，一位長者送了一句我最喜歡的格言。我多次在備忘錄里提過這句格言，但在我看來，提及得再頻繁都不為過。那就是“牛市的三個階段”：

The first stage usually comes on the heels of a market decline or crash that has left most investors licking their wounds and highly dispirited. At this point,only a few unusually insightful people are capable of imagining that there could be improvement ahead.

第一階段通常是在讓大多數投資者舔舐傷口且情緒極度低落的市場下跌或崩盤之后。此時，只有少數極具洞察力的人才能夠想象未來可能會有改善。

In the second stage, the economy, companies, and markets are doing well, andmost people accept that improvement is actually taking place.

在第二階段，經濟、公司和市場都表現良好，且大多數人都認為情況確實在改善。

In the third stage, after a period in which the economic news has been great, companies have reported soaring earnings, and stocks have appreciated wildly,everyone concludes that things can only get better forever.

在第三階段，經歷一段經濟消息都非常不錯、企業盈利飆升以及股票大幅上升的期間后，每個人都認為事情只會變得更好。

The important inferences aren’t with regard to economic or corporate events. They involve investor psychology. It’s not a matter of what’s happening in the macro world; it’s how people view the developments. When few people think there can be improvement, security prices by definition don’t incorporate much optimism. But when everyone believes things can only get better forever, it can be hard to find anything that’s reasonably priced.

重要的推論與經濟或企業活動無關，它們往往與投資者的心理相關。這不是宏觀世界發生了什么的問題，而是人們如何看待事態發展的問題。當很少有人認為情況會好轉的時候，證券價格定然不會反映多少樂觀情緒。但是，當每個人都認為事情只會變得更好時，就很難找到價格合理之物。

Bubbles are marked by bubble thinking. Perhaps for working purposes we should say that bubbles and crashes are times when extreme events cause people to lose their objectivity and view the world through highly skewed psychology – either too positive or too negative.Here’s how Kindleberger put it in the first edition of Manias, Panics, and Crashes:

泡沫以泡沫思維為標記。或者處于工作目的，我們應該說，泡沫和崩盤是極端事件導致人們失去客觀性并通過高度扭曲的心理看待世界的時候——要么過于正面，要么過于負面。以下為金德爾伯格在《瘋狂、驚恐和崩潰》（第一版）給出的說法：

. . . As firms or households see others making profits from speculative purchases and resales, they tend to follow. When the number of firms and households indulging in these practices grows larger, bringing in segments of the population that are normally aloof from such ventures, speculation for profit leads away from normal, rational behavior to what have been described as “manias” or “bubbles.”The word “mania” emphasizes the irrationality; “bubble” foreshadows the bursting.(Emphasis added)

……當企業或家庭看到其他人正在通過投機性買入并轉售獲利時，他們往往會跟隨。當越來越多的企業和家庭沉溺于這些行為無法自拔，進而把在正常情況下會遠離這種冒險行為的群體引入其中時，投機逐利會將正常而理性的行為引向所謂的“瘋狂”或“泡沫”。“瘋狂”一詞強調非理性；“泡沫”則預示著破裂。（粗體部分表示強調）

For me, it’s psychological extremeness that marks a bubble. Often, as Kindleberger indicates, it can be inferred from widespread participation in the investment fad of the moment, especially among non-financial types. Legend has it that J.P. Morgan knew there was a problem when the person shining his shoes started giving him stock tips. My partner John Frank says he saw it in 2000, when he heard the dads at his son’s soccer game bragging about the tech stocks they owned, and again in 2006, when a Las Vegas cab driver told him about the three condos he’d purchased. When Mark Twain purportedly said, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes,” it’s this kind of thing he was talking about.

在我看來，泡沫以投資心理走向極端為標記。正如金德爾伯格所指出，這可以從普遍參與當下的投資熱潮中推斷出來，尤其是在非金融人士中。傳說，當約翰·皮爾龐特·摩根的擦鞋匠開始給他薦股時，就知道出了問題了。我的合伙人John Frank說，他在2000年就發現了這個問題，當時他在兒子的足球比賽現場聽到父親們吹噓他們持有的科技股；然后在2006年聽到一位拉斯維加斯出租車司機告訴他買了三套公寓時又看到了泡沫。馬克·吐溫曾言：“歷史不會重復，卻驚人地相似”，他說的就是這種情況。

02

The New, New Thing

全新的事物

If bubble thinking is irrational, what is it that permits investors to get away from rational thinking, like the thrust of a rocket ship that breaks free of the limits imposed by gravity and attains escape velocity? There’s a simple answer:newness. This phenomenon relies on another time-honored investment phrase, “this time is different.”

如果泡沫思維是非理性的，那么是什么讓投資者脫離理性思維，仿佛火箭飛船的推力突破重力的限制達到逃逸速度一般？答案很簡單：新鮮感。這種現象依賴于另一個久負盛名的投資習語：“這次不一樣”。

Bubbles are invariably associated with new developments. There were bubbles in the Nifty Fifty stocks in the 1960s (more on them just below), disc drive companies in the 1980s, TMT/internet stocks in the late 1990s, and sub-prime mortgage-backed securities in 2004-06. These relatively recent manias followed in the tradition of ones like (a) the 1630s craze in Holland over recently introduced tulips and (b) the South Sea Bubble in 1720 England concerning the riches that were sure to ensue from a trading monopoly that the Crown had awarded to the South Sea Company.

泡沫總是與新的事態發展有關。歷史上的泡沫有：1960年代的“漂亮五十”股票（下文將詳細介紹）、1980年代的磁盤驅動器公司、1990年代末的TMT/互聯網股票和2004-06年的次級抵押貸款支持證券。這些相對近期的瘋狂沿襲了以下更為古老的泡沫：(1)1630年代荷蘭對新近引進郁金香的狂熱；以及(2)1720年發生在英格蘭的涉及到王室授予南海公司的貿易壟斷特權下必然帶來財富的南海泡沫。

In normal circumstances, if an industry’s or a country’s securities are attracting unusually high valuations, investment historians are able to point out that, in the past, those stocks had never sold at more than an x% premium over the average, or some similar metric. In this way,attention to history can serve as a tether, keeping a favored group grounded on terra firma.

在正常情況下，如果一個行業或一個國家的證券獲得異常關注而出現高估值，投資領域的“歷史學家”就常常指出，以往這些股票的溢價從未超過平均水平或類似指標的x%。通過這種方式，對歷史的關注就像一根繩索，將受青睞的群體牢牢地系在地面上。

But if something’s new, meaning there is no history, then there’s nothing to temper enthusiasm.After all, it’s owned by the brightest people – the ones who are showing up in the headlines and on TV – and they’ve made a fortune. Who’s willing to throw a wet blanket over that party or sit out that dance?

但如果是新的事物，則意味著無史可查，那么投資熱情就無從抑制了。畢竟，新事物由最聰明的人（出現在頭條新聞和電視上的人）擁有并大賺特賺。誰又愿意向派對潑冷水或者不下場狂舞呢？

The explanation often lies in Hans Christian Andersen’s story The Emperor’s New Clothes. Con men sell the emperor an allegedly gorgeous suit of clothes that only intelligent people can see. But in actuality there is no suit. When the emperor parades around town naked, the citizens are afraid to say they don’t see a suit, since that would mark them as unintelligent. This goes on unchecked until a young boy steps out of the crowd and – in his naivete – points out that the emperor has no clothes. Most people would rather go along with a shared delusion that’s making investors buckets of money than say something to the contrary and appear to be dummies.When a whole market or a group of securities is blasting off and a specious idea is making its adherents rich, few people will risk calling it out.

漢斯·克里斯汀·安徒生的故事《皇帝的新衣》往往能解釋這個問題。騙子們向皇帝兜售一套聲稱只有聰明人才能看得見的華麗衣服，但實際上并沒有衣服。當皇帝在城鎮裸體巡游時，市民都不敢說他們沒有看到衣服，因為這會讓人覺得他們不聰明。這種情況一直持續下去，直到一個小男孩從人群中走出來，天真地指出皇帝沒有穿衣服。大多數人寧愿接受一種讓投資者賺大錢的共同錯覺，也不愿說些相反的話，讓自己看起來像個傻瓜。當整個市場或一類證券被炒得沸沸揚揚，一個似是而非的想法正在讓其信徒賺得盆滿缽滿時，很少有人會冒險揭穿它。

03

My Baptism Under Fire

我的戰火洗禮

They say experience is what you got when you didn’t get what you wanted, and I got my most formative experience at the very beginning of my career. As many of my memo readers know, I joined the equity research department at First National City Bank (now Citi) in September 1969. As was the case with most of the so-called “money-center banks,” Citi invested mainly in the “Nifty Fifty”– the stocks of the best and fastest-growing companies in America. These companies were considered to be so good that (a) nothing bad could ever happen and (b) there was no price too high for their stocks . . . literally.

人們常說，所謂經驗，就是你沒能獲得你想要的東西時所得到的東西，而我在職業生涯的初期就獲得了對我影響最大的經驗。讀過我備忘錄的人大多知道，我在1969年9月加入了第一國民城市銀行（現為花旗銀行）的股票研究部。和大多數所謂的“貨幣中心銀行”一樣，花旗主要投資于“漂亮五十”——美國最好且發展最快的公司股票。投資者認為這些公司非常好，(1)斷然不會發生任何不好之事，且(2)對他們的持股來說價格再高也不為過……

Three factors contributed to investors’ fascination with these stocks. First, the U.S. economy grew strongly in the post-World War II period. Second, these companies benefitted from their involvement with areas of innovation such as computers, drugs, and consumer products. And third, they represented the first wave of “growth stocks,” a new investment style that separately became a fad in itself. The Nifty Fifty were the object of the first big bubble in roughly 40 years, and since there hadn’t been one for so long, investors had forgotten what a bubble looks like. As a result of the popularity that was conferred on them, if you bought these stocks on the day I started work and held them tenaciously for five years, you lost well over 90% of your money . . . in the best companies in America. What happened?

讓投資者迷戀這些股票的因素有三個。第一，美國經濟在二戰后期間增長強勁。第二，這些股票參與了各個創新領域（如計算機、藥品和消費品）并因此受益。第三，這些股票代表了第一波“成長股”，這是一種新的投資風格，其本身已成為一種時尚。“漂亮五十”是過去40年來的首個大型泡沫，而且由于太久沒有出現泡沫，投資者已經忘記泡沫長什么樣子了。由于這些股票在當時備受青睞，如果你在我開始工作的那天就買入這些股票，然后堅持持有五年，那么你將在美國最好的公司上虧損90%以上的資金……到底發生了什么？

The Nifty Fifty had been put on a pedestal, and investors get hurt when something falls from it. The stock market as a whole declined by about half in 1973-74. And it turned out these stocks had been selling at prices that actually were too high; in many cases, their price/earnings ratios fell from the range of 60 to 90 to the range of 6 to 9 (that’s the easy way to lose 90%). Further, bad things actually did happen to several of the companies in fundamental terms.

“漂亮五十”被捧上了神壇，一旦從神壇上跌落，受傷的自然是投資者了。整個股票市場在1973-1974年間下跌了大約一半。事實證明，這些股票的售價確實過高；大部分股票的市盈率從60到90的區間跌至6到9的區間（這便是輕松虧損90%的“方法”）。此外，確實有幾家公司遇到基本面變差的情況。

My early brush with a genuine bubble caused me to formulate some guiding principles that carried me through the next 50-odd years:

在從業初期就能與真實的投資泡沫的接觸促使我制定了一些原則，并指導我走過之后50多年的風風雨雨：

• It’s not what you buy, it’s what you pay that counts.

  買什么不是重點，重點在于你為此付出了多少（價格）。

• Good investing doesn’t come from buying good things, but from buying things well.

  好的投資不在于買好的東西，而在于買得好。

• There’s no asset so good that it can’t become overpriced and thus dangerous, and there are few assets so bad that they can’t get cheap enough to be a bargain.

  不存在一種好到價格從來都不存在“高估”而風險的資產，也鮮有一種壞到價格從來都不存在“低估”機會的資產。

04

Things Can Only Get Better

事情只會變得更好

The bubbles I’ve lived through have all involved innovations, as I noted above, and many of those were either overestimated or not fully understood. The attractions of a new product or way of doing business are usually obvious, but the potholes and pitfalls are often hidden and only discovered in trying times. A new company may completely outclass its predecessors, but investors who by definition lack experience in this new field often fail to grasp that even a bright newcomer can be supplanted. The disrupters can be disrupted, whether by skillful competitors or even newer technologies.

我經歷過的泡沫，如前所述，全都與創新有關，而大多創新要么被高估，要么未得到充分理解。一種新產品或營商之道通常會展現出顯而易見的吸引力，但其中的陷阱和風險往往難以發現，甚至要到困難時期才會被發現。新的公司固然有可能完全超越其前輩，但在這一新領域缺乏經驗的投資者往往無法理解，就算是前途光明的新公司也可能會被取代。顛覆者也有可能被顛覆，要么被技勝一籌的競爭者顛覆，要么被更先進的技術所顛覆。

In my early decades in business, technology seemed to evolve gradually. Computers, drugs, and other innovative products improved a little at a time. But in the 1990s, innovation came in a big rush. When Oaktree was founded in 1995, I insisted that I could get by with just WordPerfect for word processing and Lotus 1-2-3 for spreadsheets. But when we moved to our current office in 1998, I threw in the towel and let our IT team install e-mail and the internet (and, of course, WordPerfect gave way to Word, and Lotus 1-2-3 to Excel). At the time, investors were sure “the internet will change the world.” It certainly looked that way, and that assumption prompted tremendous demand for everything internet-related. E-commerce stocks went public at seemingly high prices and then tripled the first day. There was a real goldrush.

在我事業生涯的前幾十年，科技似乎是以漸進的方式發展。計算機、藥品和其他創新產品則以平穩節奏前進。但進入1990年代，創新層出不窮。1995年橡樹資本成立時，我堅持認為，處理文字只能靠WordPerfect軟件，電子表格只有Lotus 1-2-3軟件。但是當我們在1998年搬到目前的辦公室時，我認輸了，并讓IT團隊安裝了電子郵件系統和互聯網瀏覽器（當然，WordPerfect讓位于Word以及Lotus 1-2-3讓位于Excel）。當時，投資者確信“互聯網將改變世界”。看起來確實是這樣，而該假設催生了對各種互聯網相關事物的巨大需求。電子商務股以看似很高的價格掛牌上市，然后第一天就翻了三倍。隨之而來的是一場真正的淘金熱潮。

There’s usually a grain of truth that underlies every mania and bubble. It just gets taken too far. It’s clear that the internet absolutely did change the world – in fact, we can’t imagine a world without it. But the vast majority of internet and e-commerce companies that soared in the late ’90s bubble ended up worthless. When a bubble burst in my early investing days, The Wall Street Journal would run a box on the front page listing stocks that were down by 90%. In the aftermath of the TMT Bubble, they’d lost 99%.

每一輪狂熱和泡沫背后通常都潛藏著真理，只是這種合理性被過度放大了。顯然，互聯網確實改變了世界——事實上，我們無法想象一個沒有互聯網的世界。但是，絕大多數在90年代末的泡沫中狂飆的互聯網和電子商務公司最終都變得一文不值。在我投資生涯早期的一次泡沫破裂期間，《華爾街日報》會在頭版刊登一個欄目，列出下跌幅度達90%的股票。在TMT泡沫后的一段時間里，那些公司的跌幅達到了99%。

When something is on the pedestal of popularity, the risk of a decline is high. When people assume – and price in – an expectation that things can only get better, the damage done by negative surprises is profound. When something is new, the competitors and disruptive technologies have yet to arrive. The merit may be there, but if it’s overestimated it can be overpriced, only to evaporate when reality sets in. In the real world, trees don’t grow to the sky.

當某樣事物被追捧至頂峰的時候，其跌落的風險會很高。當人們假設并預期事情只會變得更好時，意料之外的負面情況所造成的傷害將會刻骨銘心。在某樣事物剛剛興起時，競爭對手和顛覆性科技尚未浮現。可能其中確實存在優點，但如果被高估，價格就會變得過高，當大家認識到現實后，一切就煙消云散了。在現實世界中，樹木是長不到天上去的。

The foregoing discussion centered on the risk of overestimating fundamental strength. But optimism surrounding the power and potential of the new thing often causes the error to be compounded through the assignment of too high a stock price.

上文集中討論了高估基本面能力所帶來的風險。但是對新事物蘊含的力量和潛力所持的樂觀態度往往會導致這項事物被賦予過高的股票價值，從而讓錯誤變得復雜。

• As mentioned above, for something new, there by definition is no historical indicator of what an appropriate valuation might be.

  如前所述，對于新事物，必然不存在可衡量適當估值的歷史指標。

• Further, the companies’ potential hasn’t yet been turned into steady-state profits, meaning the thing that’s being valued is conjectural. In the TMT Bubble, the companies didn’t have earnings, so p/e ratios were out. And as startups, they often didn’t have revenues to value. As a result, new metrics were invented, and trusting investors ended up paying a multiple of “clicks” or “eyeballs,” regardless of whether these measurables could be turned into revenues and profits.

  此外，這些公司的潛力尚未轉化為穩定的利潤，意味著所被估值之物僅為揣測。在TMT泡沫中，這些公司并無盈利，因此無市盈率可查。此外，作為初創公司，他們往往沒有收入可供估值。因此，新指標應運而生，投資者盲目追捧“點擊率”或“觀看率”作為價值標準，而忽視這些指標是否能夠真正轉化為收入和利潤。

• Since bubble participants can’t imagine there being any downside, they tend to award valuations that assume success.

  由于泡沫參與者無法想象會有任何不利情況，他們所賦予的估值往往是針對假設取得成功的情況。

• In fact, it’s not infrequent for investors to treat all contenders in a new field as likely to succeed, whereas in reality only a few may thrive, or perhaps even survive.

  事實上，投資者認為某個新興領域的所有競爭者都有可能成功，這種心態并不少見，但現實往往是，只有少數幾家公司能夠茁壯成長，甚至存活下來。

• Ultimately, with a really hot new thing, investors can adopt what I call “a lottery ticket mentality.” If a successful startup in a hot field can return 200x, it’s mathematically worth investing in even if it’s only 1% likely to succeed. And what doesn’t have a 1% likelihood of success? When investors think this way, there are few limits on what they’ll support or the prices they’ll pay.

  最后，投資者可能對極為熱門的新事物采取我所說的“彩票心態”。如果在熱門領域中，一家成功的初創公司能夠提供200倍的回報，那么從數學上來講，即使成功的概率只有1%，也值得投資。那么，有什么投資會連1%的成功概率都沒有呢？如果投資者如此想，他們支持的事物或他們愿意支付的價格就幾乎沒有上限。

Obviously, investors can get caught up in the race to buy the new, new thing. That’s where the bubble comes in.

顯然，投資者會陷入競逐買入新事物的泥潭中。這就是泡沫的來源。

05

What’s the Appropriate Price to Pay for a Bright Future?

光明未來的合理定價是多少？

If there’s a company for sale that will make $1 million next year and then shut down, how much would you pay for it? The right answer is a little less than $1 million, so that you’ll have a positive return on your money.

如果有一家明年賺完100萬美元就倒閉的公司待售，你會為這家公司支付多少錢？正確的答案是略低于100萬美元，唯有如此，你的投資才能獲得正回報。

But stocks are priced at “p/e multiples” – that is, multiples of next year’s earnings. Why? Because presumably they won’t earn profits for just one year; they’ll go on making money for many more. When you buy a stock, you buy a share of the company’s earnings every year into the future. The price of the S&P 500 has averaged roughly 16 times earnings in the post-World War II period. This is typically described as meaning “you’re paying for 16 years of earnings.” It’s actually more than that, though, because the process of discounting makes $1 of profit in the future worth less than $1 today. The current value of a company is the discounted present value of its future earnings, so a p/e ratio of 16 means you’re paying for more than 20 years of earnings (depending on the interest rate at which future earnings are discounted).

但是，股票是按“市盈率”（即次年盈利的倍數）定價的。為什么？因為很有可能公司不會只盈利一年；公司將會在后續的很多年繼續盈利。當你買入一只股票時，你買入的是該公司未來每年盈利的一部分。第二次世界大戰后，標普500的平均市盈率約為16倍，即，也就是所謂“你正在為16年的盈利買單”。但實際上遠不止于此，因為貼現算法使得未來1美元的利潤價值低于今天的1美元。一家公司的當前價值若是其未來盈利的貼現現值的話，那么16倍市盈率實際意味著你正在為超過20年的盈利買單（取決于貼現未來盈利的利率）。

In bubbles, hot stocks sell for considerably more than 16 times earnings. Remember the 60 to 90 times for the Nifty Fifty! Investors in 1969 were paying for companies’ earnings – even after giving them credit for significant earnings growth – many decades into the future. Did they do so consciously and analytically? Not that I recall. Investors thought of a p/e ratio as just a number . . . if they thought about it at all.

而且在泡沫時期，熱門股票的市盈率遠高于16倍。當年的“漂亮五十”的市盈率達60至90倍！就算他們真的將會如預期那樣出現顯著的盈利增長，但是1969年的投資者正是在為未來“幾十年”的公司盈利買單。他們是有意識、有分析地這樣做的嗎？我記得并沒有。投資者認為市盈率只是一個數字…如果他們真有想過市盈率的話。

Today’s S&P-leading companies are, in many ways, much better than the best companies of the past. They enjoy massive technological advantages. They have vast scale, dominant market shares, and thus above average profit margins. And since their products are based on ideas more than metal, the marginal cost of producing an additional unit is low, meaning their marginal profitability is unusually high.

如今標普指數的龍頭公司在很多方面都遠優于以往最好的公司。這些公司享有巨大的科技優勢，并擁有龐大的規模，占主導地位的市場份額以及超越均值的盈利水平。此外，由于它們的產品更多是基于創意而非實體原材料，生產額外單位的邊際成本很低，換言之，邊際利潤率非常高。

The further good news is that today’s leaders don’t trade at the p/e ratios investors applied to the Nifty Fifty. Perhaps the sexiest of the seven is Nvidia, the leading designer of chips for artificial intelligence. It’s current multiple of future earnings is in the low 30s, depending on which earnings estimate you believe. While double the average post-war p/e on the S&P 500, that’s cheap compared to the Nifty Fifty. But what does a multiple in the 30s imply? First, that investors think Nvidia will be in business for decades to come. Second, that its profits will grow throughout those decades. And third, that it won’t be supplanted by competitors.

In other words, investors are assuming Nvidia will demonstratepersistence.

而且，如今的龍頭公司的市盈率并沒有漂亮五十那般高。在“美股七雄”中，最誘人的可能是人工智能芯片的領先設計商英偉達。該公司當前的未來市盈率僅為30出頭，這取決于你采取哪一種盈利估計方法。雖然是戰后標普500指數平均市盈率的兩倍，但仍遠低于漂亮五十。但是，30倍市盈率意味著什么呢？第一，投資者認為英偉達將在未來幾十年持續經營。第二，該公司的利潤將在這幾十年內持續增長。第三，該公司不會被競爭對手所取代。換言之，投資者正在假設英偉達將能夠持久長青。

But persistence isn’t easily achieved, especially in high-tech fields where new technologies can arise and new competitors can leapfrog incumbents. It’s worth noting, for example, that only about half the Nifty Fifty (as enumerated by Wikipedia – there is no agreed-on list) are in the S&P 500 today (that figure undoubtedly looks worse than the reality, since mergers and acquisitions caused some of the old names to disappear, not failures). Leading lights of 1969 that are missing from the S&P 500 today include Xerox, Kodak, Polaroid, Avon, Burroughs, Digital Equipment, and my favorite, Simplicity Pattern (how many people make their own clothing these days?).

但是，持久長青不容易做到，特別是在新科技層出不窮、新競爭對手可能超越現有企業的高科技領域。舉例而言，值得注意的是，如今還留在標普500的漂亮五十（漂亮五十僅援引維基百科所列舉，并無公認名單）只有一半左右（該數字看起來無疑比現實更為糟糕，因為導致一些“老字號”消失的是并購活動，而非經營失敗）。如今標普500中已經消失的1969年的龍頭企業包括施樂、柯達、寶麗來、雅芳、伯勒斯、Digital Equipment以及我最喜歡的Simplicity Pattern（現在有多少人自己做衣服？）。

Another indication of how hard it is to persist can be seen in the names of the top twenty S&P 500 companies. At the beginning of 2000, according to finhacker.cz, these twenty companies were the most heavily represented in the index:

此外，從標普500的前二十大公司名字可見，持久長青到底有多難。根據finhacker.cz的數據，2000年初，以下20家公司在指數中的占比最高：

At the beginning of 2024, however, only six of them were still in the top twenty:

然而，2024年年初，只有其中六家公司仍在前二十大之列：

Importantly, of today’s Magnificent Seven, only Microsoft was in the top twenty 24 years ago.

尤其，在如今的美股七雄中，只有微軟是24年前的前二十大公司之一。

In bubbles, investors treat the leading companies – and pay for their stocks – as though the firms are sure to remain leaders for decades. Some do and some don’t, but change seems to be more the rule than persistence.

在泡沫期間，投資者愿意為龍頭公司的高昂股票價格買單，他們認為這些龍頭企業定然會幾十年如一日地占據領先地位。但是，有些公司能做到，有些公司做不到。變化才是永恒不變的規則，而非持久長青。

06

Whole Markets

整個市場

The greatest bubbles usually originate in connection with innovations, mostly technological or financial, and they initially affect a small group of stocks. But sometimes they extend to whole markets, as the fervor for a bubble group spreads to everything.

最大的泡沫通常發源于創新領域、而且多半與科技方面或金融方面的創新有關，最初只有一小部分股票受到影響。但有時會擴展到整個市場，因為對某一泡沫群體的狂熱會蔓延到一切。

In the 1990s, the S&P 500 was borne aloft by (a) the continuing decline of interest rates from their inflation-fighting peak in the early 1980s and (b) the return of investor enthusiasm for stocks that had been lost in the traumatic ’70s. Technological innovation and the rapid earnings growth of the high-tech companies added to the excitement. And an upswing in the popularity of stocks was reinforced by new academic research showing there had never been a long period in which the S&P 500 failed to outperform bonds, cash, and inflation. The combination of these positive factors caused the annual return on the index to average more than 20% for the decade. I’ve never seen another period like it.

1990年代，在(1)利率從1980年代初對抗通貨膨脹的峰值持續下降；及(2)投資者因70年代的慘痛經歷而對股票喪失的熱情重燃的推動下，標普500一路走高。科技創新和高科技公司的快速盈利增長也為市場的激昂情緒火上澆油。當時的學術研究還指出標普500從來沒有出現過長時間跑輸債券、現金和通貨膨脹的情況，這進一步助推了股票受歡迎程度的上升態勢。在上述積極因素的綜合影響下，標普500指數在那十年實現了超過20%的年化回報率，這種時代是我前所未見的。

I always say the riskiest thing in the world is the belief that there’s no risk.In a similar vein, heated buying spurred by the observation that stocks had never performed poorly for a long period caused stock prices to rise to a point from which they were destined to do just that.In my view, that’s George Soros’s investment “reflexivity” at work. Stocks were tarred in the bursting of the TMT Bubble, and the S&P 500 declined in 2000, 2001, and 2002 for the first three-year decline since 1939, during the Great Depression.As a consequence of this poor performance, investors deserted stocks en masse, causing the S&P 500 to have a cumulative return ofzerofor the more than eleven years from the bubble peak in mid-2000 until December 2011.

我經常說，在這個世界上，最大的風險莫過于認為沒有風險。同樣地，受股票從未長時間表現不佳的觀察所引發的激烈買盤，導致股票價格上升至注定會出現這種情況的點位。在我看來，這是喬治·索羅斯的投資“反身性”在起作用。股票在TMT泡沫破裂時遭受重創，且標普500在2000年、2001年和2002年下跌，為自1939年大蕭條以來的首次連續三年下跌。受這種糟糕表現影響，投資者爭相拋售股票，導致標普500從2000年中泡沫見頂后，至2011年12月止逾十一年期間的累計回報率為零。

Lately, I’ve been repeating a quote I attribute to Warren Buffett: “When investors forget that corporate profits grow about 7% per year they tend to get into trouble.” What this means is that if corporate profits grow at 7% a year and stocks (which represent a share in corporate profits) appreciate at 20% a year for a while, eventually stocks will be so highly priced relative to their earnings that they’ll be risky. (I recently asked Warren for a source on the quote, and he told me he never said it. But I think it’s great, so I keep using it.)

最近，我一直在重復沃倫·巴菲特的一句話：“當投資者忘記了企業利潤的年增長率約為7%的時候，他們往往會陷入麻煩”。這意味著，如果企業利潤每年增長7%，而股票（代表企業利潤的一部分）在一段時間內每年漲幅達20%，那么最終股票的市盈率將會過高，以至于產生風險。（我最近請教沃倫·巴菲特這句話的出處，而他告訴我，他從未說過這句話。但我認為這句話很棒，因此我一直引用。）

The point is that when stocks rise too fast – out of proportion to the growth in the underlying companies’ earnings – they’re unlikely to keep on appreciating. Michael Cembalest has another chart that makes this point. It shows that prior to two years ago, there were only four times in the history of the S&P 500 when it returned 20% or more for two years in a row. In three of those four instances (a small sample, mind you), the index declined in the subsequent two-year period. (The exception was 1995-98, when the powerful TMT bubble caused the decline to be delayed until 2000, but then the index lost almost 40% in three years.)

關鍵點在于，當股票上漲過快（相對發行企業的盈利增長不成比例）時，就不太可能持續升值。Michael Cembalest在另一張圖表中闡明了這一點。該圖表顯示，在兩年之前，標普500歷史上只有四次連續兩年的回報率達到或超過20%。在這四次（注意，這只是一個小樣本）中，指數有三次在接下來的兩年中出現了回撤。（1995-1998年是個例外——強大的TMT泡沫將回撤推遲到2000年，而在接下來的三年里指數下撤了40%。）

In the last two years, it’s happened for the fifth time. The S&P 500 was up 26% in 2023 and 25% in 2024, for the best two-year stretch since 1997-98. That brings us to 2025. What lies ahead?

過去兩年，這種情況第五次出現，標普500在2023年上升26%并在2024年上升25%，可謂是1997-1998年以來的最好兩年期表現。然后我們進入了2025年。未來將如何？

The cautionary signs today include these:

如今出現的警示信號包括：

• the optimism that has prevailed in the markets since late 2022,

  自2022年底以來充斥市場的樂觀情緒；
  

• the above average valuation on the S&P 500, and the fact that its stocks in most industrial groups sell at higher multiples than stocks in those industries in the rest of the world,

  標普500指數的估值高于平均水平，且大部分行業群組的市盈率高于世界其他地區同類產業中的公司的市盈率；

• the enthusiasm that is being applied to the new thing of AI, and perhaps the extension of that positive psychology to other high-tech areas,

  對人工智能這一新興事物的熱情，以及這種樂觀心態可能會蔓延到其他高科技領域；

• the implicit presumption that the top seven companies will continue to be successful, and

  默認“美股七雄”將持續取得成功；以及

• the possibility that some of the appreciation of the S&P has stemmed from automated buying of these stocks by index investors, without regard for their intrinsic value.

  標普500指數的上漲部分源自指數投資者在沒有考慮股票內在價值的情況下自動購買這些股票。

Finally, while I’m at it, although it’s not directly related to stocks, I have to mention Bitcoin. Regardless of its merit, the fact that its price rose 465% in the last two years doesn’t suggest an overabundance of caution.

最后，我們來說說比特幣，雖然它與股票并不直接相關。拋開比特幣的優點不談，比特幣的價格在過去兩年上升465%的事實顯然不能成為投資者過于謹慎的作證。

I often find that, just as I’m about to release a memo for publication, something comes along that demands inclusion, and it has happened again. On the last day of 2024, I received something from two sources that fits that description:

正如我一直說的，我常常發現，就在我要發布備忘錄的時候總會有事情發生，這次也不例外。在2024年的最后一天，我從兩個來源收到了符合這一描述的東西：

The graph, from J.P. Morgan Asset Management, has a square for each month from 1988 through late 2014, meaning there are just short of 324 monthly observations (27 years x 12). Each square shows the forward p/e ratio on the S&P 500 at the time and the annualized return over the subsequent ten years. The graph gives rise to some important observations:

這張來自摩根大通資產管理公司的圖表，從1988年到2014年底的每個月觀察一次并以方塊表示，整張圖324個月度觀察值（27年 x 12）。每個方塊代表當時標普500指數的遠期市盈率以及隨后十年的年化回報率。這張圖發人深省：

• There’s a strong relationship between starting valuations and subsequent annualized ten-year returns.Higher starting valuations consistently lead to lower returns, and vice versa.There are minor variations in the observations, but no serious exceptions.

  期初估值與隨后十年的年化回報率之間存在強烈關系。較高的期初估值往往導致較低的回報，反之亦然。雖然觀察結果存在一些細微差異，但沒有嚴重的例外情況。

• Today’s p/e ratio is clearly well into the top decile of observations.

  今天的市盈率明顯處于觀察樣本區間的最高十分位數。

• In that 27-year period, when people bought the S&P at p/e ratios in line with today’s multiple of 22, they alwaysearned ten-year returns between plus 2% and minus 2%.

  在1988年至2014年的27年期間，當投資者以與今天相當的市盈率，即22倍，購買標普500指數時，他們往往只能獲得介于正2%和負2%之間的十年回報率。

In November, a couple of leading banks came out with projected ten-year returns for the S&P 500 in the low- to mid-single digits. The above relationship is the reason.It shouldn’t come as a surprise that the return on an investment is significantly a function of the price paid for it. For that reason, investors clearly shouldn’t be indifferent to today’s market valuation.

在11月，幾家行業領先的銀行發布了標普500指數未來十年的回報率預測，預測值處于中低個位數。上述市盈率估值與投資回報的關系是恰好是注解。投資回報顯著取決于投資支付的價格，這并不令人意外。因此，投資者顯然不應對當下的股票市場估值漠不關心。

You might say, “making plus-or-minus-2% wouldn’t be the worst thing in the world,” and that’s certainly true if stocks were to sit still for the next ten years as the companies’ earnings rose, bringing the multiples back to earth. But another possibility is that the multiple correction is compressed into a year or two, implying a big decline in stock prices such as we saw in 1973-74 and 2000-02. The result in that case wouldn’t be benign.

你可能會說，“獲得正負2%的年化回報并不是世界上最糟糕的事情”，如果股票價格在未來十年保持不變，而公司的盈利水平上升，那么市盈率就會從高估位置回到正常水平，話是沒錯。但另一種可能性也存在，那就是市盈率可能在一到兩年內受到擠壓，股票價格將出現大幅下跌，就像我們在1973-1974年和2000-2002年看到的那樣。在這種情況下，結果真的很糟糕。

The above are the things to worry about. Here are the counterarguments:

以上是需要擔心的事情。接下來是反面論點：

• the p/e ratio on the S&P 500 is high but not insane,

  標普500的市盈率很高，但并不離譜；

• the Magnificent Seven are incredible companies, so their high p/e ratios could be warranted,

  “美股七雄”是令人驚嘆的優質公司，這些公司的市盈率并不離譜；

• I don’t hear people saying, “there’s no price too high;” and

  我并未聽到人們傳出“價格再高也不為過”的言論；以及

• the markets, while high-priced and perhaps frothy, don’t seem nutty to me.

  市場雖然價格高企，或許還存在泡沫，但在我看來并不瘋狂。

As I said at the start of this memo, I’m not an equity investor, and I’m certainly no expert on technology. Thus,I can’t speak authoritatively about whether we’re in a bubble. I just want to lay out the facts as I see them and suggest how you might think about them . . . just as I did 25 years ago.

正如我在本備忘錄開篇所說，我并非股票投資者，當然也不是科技方面的專家。因此，我無法就現在是否處于泡沫之中發表權威言論。我只想列出所見事實，并就如何看待這些事實提供建議…就像我25年前所做的那樣。

I hope you’ll keep reading for the next 25!

我希望未來25年您還將繼續閱讀我的備忘錄！

January 2, 2025

2025年1月2日

（本文轉載于公眾號：橡樹資本Oaktree Capital）

xiang shuai

關注微博，獲取更多香帥時評

更多感悟，更多陪伴