大外交青年智庫·深圳

Glory Diplomacy

讓中國外交青年智慧被全球看見

為中國青年智庫代言

01

今日語錄

（2025年3月10日）

我們?nèi)绻此家簧慕?jīng)歷，都是當(dāng)時處境使然，不由自主。但是關(guān)鍵時刻，做主的還是自己。

——〔中〕楊絳《走到人生邊上》

02

基式外交：第二階段與伊拉克

大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第1期

作者：亨利?A?基辛格

來源：大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第1期

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "Phase II and Iraq." The Washington Post, January 13, 2002.

聲明：基式外交研究中心轉(zhuǎn)載、編譯與翻譯的內(nèi)容均為非商業(yè)性引用（學(xué)術(shù)研究），不作商用，如有問題請即刻聯(lián)系

一、全文翻譯

隨著阿富汗軍事行動逐漸收尾，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)牢記布什總統(tǒng)的警告：這些行動僅僅是一場長期戰(zhàn)爭的首輪戰(zhàn)役。

在實現(xiàn)以下目標(biāo)方面已邁出重要一步：打破政府與受其支持或默許的恐怖組織之間的紐帶；削弱伊斯蘭原教旨主義的影響力，使伊斯蘭世界的溫和派能夠從狂熱分子手中奪回對宗教的主導(dǎo)權(quán)；將反恐斗爭與薩達姆?侯賽因統(tǒng)治下的伊拉克對地區(qū)穩(wěn)定及美國盟友和利益構(gòu)成的地緣政治威脅相結(jié)合。然而，仍有大量工作亟待完成。

倘若我們退縮，阿富汗的勝利終將被解讀為僅針對最薄弱、最偏遠的恐怖主義中心，而對更核心地區(qū)的恐怖主義問題避而不談。

部分聯(lián)盟成員主張單純依賴外交手段，認為剩余任務(wù)可通過國際協(xié)商及情報和安全部門的合作完成。但單純依賴外交將重蹈美國在過去半個世紀(jì)每場戰(zhàn)爭中的覆轍。由于將軍事行動與外交割裂并按順序處理，美國在朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭中因?qū)κ肿呦蛘勁凶蓝⒓赐Ｖ管娛滦袆樱辉谠侥蠎?zhàn)爭中為換取巴黎和談機會而停止轟炸北越；在海灣戰(zhàn)爭中因伊拉克撤離科威特而終止軍事行動。

每次軍事壓力的解除均導(dǎo)致外交僵局。朝鮮停戰(zhàn)談判耗時兩年，期間美軍傷亡人數(shù)與整個戰(zhàn)斗階段相當(dāng)；越南談判陷入更棘手的僵局；在波斯灣，薩達姆?侯賽因利用停火協(xié)議保留的共和國衛(wèi)隊重新控制領(lǐng)土，并系統(tǒng)性破壞停火協(xié)議中的核查條款。

若無武力威脅支撐，反恐政策將淪為空談。軍事行動的反對者及其潛在目標(biāo)只會拖延或同意象征性舉措。具有諷刺意味的是，那些默許恐怖分子在其領(lǐng)土活動的政府，除非不合作的后果比與恐怖分子的暗中交易更危險，否則極難真正配合。

因此，反恐戰(zhàn)役第二階段必須提出一套具體要求，設(shè)定明確時間表，并輔以可信的強制力量。這些應(yīng)盡快作為框架提出，且時間至關(guān)重要。第二階段必須在美國遭受襲擊的記憶仍鮮活、美軍部署力量可支持外交行動時啟動。

第二階段不應(yīng)與阿富汗的綏靖行動混淆。美國的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)是摧毀恐怖網(wǎng)絡(luò)，這已基本實現(xiàn)。阿富汗全境的平定從未被外國勢力完成，也不應(yīng)成為美軍的目標(biāo)。美國應(yīng)慷慨提供經(jīng)濟和發(fā)展援助，但第二階段的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)應(yīng)是摧毀全球恐怖網(wǎng)絡(luò)，防止其在阿富汗死灰復(fù)燃，而非卷入阿富汗內(nèi)戰(zhàn)。

索馬里和也門常被提及為第二階段的可能目標(biāo)。這一決策應(yīng)取決于能否確定當(dāng)?shù)卣心芰Υ驌舻哪繕?biāo)，以及若當(dāng)?shù)卣疅o力或不愿行動時美軍是否適合完成任務(wù)。鑒于這些限制，美國需判斷對其采取行動是否具有戰(zhàn)略價值。

所有這一切都指向伊拉克構(gòu)成的不可回避的挑戰(zhàn)。問題不在于伊拉克是否參與了對美國的恐怖襲擊，而在于其本質(zhì)上的地緣政治威脅。伊拉克的政策對美國及某些鄰國具有強烈敵意。它擁有不斷增加的生物和化學(xué)武器庫存（薩達姆?侯賽因曾在兩伊戰(zhàn)爭中對伊朗及本國人民使用過這些武器），并正致力于發(fā)展核能力。侯賽因違背對聯(lián)合國的承諾，驅(qū)逐了作為結(jié)束海灣戰(zhàn)爭停火協(xié)議一部分進駐其領(lǐng)土的國際核查人員。華盛頓與巴格達之間不存在談判可能，也沒有任何依據(jù)信任伊拉克對國際社會的承諾。

若這些能力未被消除，它們可能最終被用于恐怖主義目的，或在薩達姆?侯賽因引發(fā)的新地區(qū)或國際動蕩中被使用。若其政權(quán)在海灣戰(zhàn)爭和反恐戰(zhàn)役后仍存活，僅此一點就將使其成為潛在的巨大威脅。

從長遠看，第二階段的最大機遇是使伊拉克在地區(qū)中回歸負責(zé)任角色。若伊拉克由不對鄰國構(gòu)成威脅且愿意放棄大規(guī)模殺傷性武器的團體執(zhí)政，地區(qū)穩(wěn)定將得到極大提升。其余與恐怖主義原教旨主義曖昧不清或默許其勒索的政權(quán)將被迫停止支持恐怖主義。

至少，我們應(yīng)堅持建立聯(lián)合國核查體系，以消除伊拉克的大規(guī)模殺傷性武器，賦予核查人員無限核查權(quán)和行動自由。但目前此類體系尚未形成書面方案，而建立該體系所需的努力可能等同于推翻薩達姆?侯賽因所需的行動。尤其值得注意的是，鑒于生物和化學(xué)武器的易生產(chǎn)性，核查必須極為深入，而經(jīng)驗表明，任何核查都無法長期抵御一個堅決反對的東道國的阻撓。

但若要認真考慮推翻薩達姆?侯賽因，必須滿足三個前提條件：（1）制定迅速而果斷的軍事計劃；（2）就取代侯賽因的政權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)達成初步共識；（3）獲得實施軍事計劃所需關(guān)鍵國家的支持或默許。

對薩達姆?侯賽因的軍事行動不能曠日持久。否則，戰(zhàn)爭可能演變?yōu)橐了固m世界與西方的對抗。這還將使侯賽因有機會通過對以色列發(fā)動襲擊（可能使用生化武器）將其卷入沖突，從而在穆斯林世界制造混亂。一場持續(xù)六個月以上的戰(zhàn)爭還將使美國更難維持盟友及俄羅斯、中國等國的支持——這些國家雖未必加入行動，但更不愿公開反對。

因此，布什政府在與伊拉克對抗前需極其謹慎地審視隱含的軍事戰(zhàn)略。十年前海灣戰(zhàn)爭所需的大規(guī)模兵力可能不再必要，但僅依賴美國空中力量和當(dāng)?shù)胤磳ε闪α繉⑹俏ｋU的。誠然，當(dāng)代精確武器在海灣戰(zhàn)爭時尚未達到現(xiàn)有規(guī)模，禁飛區(qū)也將使伊拉克增援困難。可通過將禁飛區(qū)升級為禁止特定類別武器移動的 “禁行區(qū)” 來強化其效果。

然而，我們不能將美國國家安全完全（甚至主要）寄托于尚未形成且作戰(zhàn)能力未經(jīng)檢驗的當(dāng)?shù)胤磳ε闪α俊?/strong>或許如某些人所言，伊拉克軍隊會在首次交鋒時崩潰，但這種可能性只有在美國軍事力量以壓倒性姿態(tài)直接支持當(dāng)?shù)亓α繒r才會大幅增加。

對伊拉克軍事行動的第二個前提是明確政治結(jié)局。當(dāng)?shù)胤磳ε珊芸赡苡杀辈康膸鞝柕律贁?shù)民族和南部的什葉派多數(shù)構(gòu)成。但若要爭取目前主導(dǎo)伊拉克的遜尼派少數(shù)參與推翻薩達姆?侯賽因，必須明確美國的政策目標(biāo)并非肢解伊拉克。這一點尤為重要，因為對伊拉克的軍事行動需要土耳其的支持和沙特阿拉伯的默許。若預(yù)見到北部出現(xiàn)獨立庫爾德國家、南部出現(xiàn)什葉派共和國，兩國均不可能合作。庫爾德國家將煽動土耳其境內(nèi)的庫爾德少數(shù)民族，而南部的什葉派國家將威脅沙特的達蘭地區(qū)，并可能為伊朗提供新的基地以謀求主導(dǎo)海灣地區(qū)。建立聯(lián)邦制統(tǒng)一伊拉克是解決這一問題的途徑。

為這一行動組建合適的聯(lián)盟并為美軍部署尋找基地將困難重重。第二階段可能使那些加入聯(lián)盟旨在對美國行動行使否決權(quán)的成員，與愿意采取堅決戰(zhàn)略的成員產(chǎn)生分歧。然而，塑造反恐第一階段的嫻熟外交將為后續(xù)行動奠定基礎(chǔ)。薩達姆?侯賽因在海灣地區(qū)沒有盟友。英國基于與美國的特殊關(guān)系，不會輕易放棄其在危機演變中贏得的關(guān)鍵角色。德國（尤其在選舉年）也不會積極反對美國。俄羅斯、中國和日本同樣如此。因此，美國的堅定政策擁有比普遍認為更大的回旋余地。

但第二階段將遠比第一階段艱難。當(dāng)?shù)兀ㄓ绕涫且晾耍┑牡挚箤⒏鼒詻Q、更殘酷。許多國家的國內(nèi)反對聲浪將加劇。美國公眾輿論對維持這一進程至關(guān)重要，需要布什總統(tǒng)在危機第一階段展現(xiàn)的那種果斷而巧妙的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力來引導(dǎo)。

二、材料全文

As military operations in Afghanistan wind down, it is well to keep in mind President Bush's injunction that they are only the first battles of a long war.

An important step has been taken toward the goals of breaking the nexus between governments and the terrorist groups they support or tolerate, discrediting Islamic fundamentalism so that moderates in the Islamic world can reclaim their religion from the fanatics, and placing the fight against terrorism in the context of the geopolitical threat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq to regional stability and to American friends and interests in the region. But much more needs to be done.

Were we to flinch, the success in Afghanistan would be interpreted in time as taking on the weakest and most remote of the terrorist centers while we recoiled from unraveling terrorism in countries more central to the problem.

Sole reliance on diplomacy is the preferred course of some members of the coalition, which claim that the remaining tasks can be accomplished by consultation and the cooperation of intelligence and security services around the world. But to rely solely on diplomacy would be to repeat the mistake with which the United States hamstrung itself in every war of the past half-century. Because it treated military operations and diplomacy as separate and sequential, the United States stopped military operations in Korea as soon as our adversaries moved to the conference table; it ended the bombing of North Vietnam as an entrance price to the Paris talks; it stopped military operations in the Gulf after the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

In each case, the ending of military pressure produced diplomatic stalemate. The Korean armistice negotiations consumed two years, during which America suffered as many casualties as in the entire combat phase; an even more intractable stalemate developed in the Vietnam negotiations; and in the Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein used the Republican Guard divisions preserved by the armistice to restore control over his territory and to dismantle systematically the inspection provisions of the armistice agreement.

Anti-terrorism policy is empty if it is not backed by the threat of force. Intellectual opponents of military action as well as its likely targets will procrastinate or agree to token or symbolic remedies only. Ironically, governments on whose territory terrorists are tolerated will find it especially difficult to cooperate unless the consequences of failing to do so are made more risky than their tacit bargain with the terrorists.

Phase II of the anti-terrorism campaign must therefore involve a specific set of demands geared to a precise timetable supported by credible coercive power. These should be put forward as soon as possible as a framework. And time is of the essence. Phase II must begin while the memory of the attack on the United States is still vivid and American-deployed forces are available to back up the diplomacy.

Nor should Phase II be confused with the pacification of Afghanistan. The American strategic objective was to destroy the terrorist network; that has been largely accomplished. Pacification of the entire country of Afghanistan has never been achieved by foreigners and cannot be the objective of the American military effort. The United States should be generous with economic and development assistance. But the strategic goal of Phase II should be the destruction of the global terrorist network, to prevent its reappearance in Afghanistan, but not to be drawn into Afghan civil strife.

Somalia and Yemen are often mentioned as possible targets for a Phase II campaign. That decision should depend on the ability to identify targets against which local governments are able to act and on the suitability of American forces to accomplish this task if the local governments can't or won't. And given these limitations, the United States will have to decide whether action against them is strategically productive.

All this raises the unavoidable challenge Iraq poses. The issue is not whether Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of Iraq is essentially geopolitical. Iraq's policy is implacably hostile to the United States and to certain neighboring countries. It possesses growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population. It is working to develop a nuclear capability. Hussein breached his commitment to the United Nations by evicting the international inspectors he had accepted on his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War. There is no possibility of a negotiation between Washington and Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international community.

If these capabilities remain intact, they could in time be used for terrorist goals or by Saddam Hussein in the midst of some new regional or international upheaval. And if his regime survives both the Gulf War and the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone will elevate him to a potentially overwhelming menace.

From a long-range point of view, the greatest opportunity of Phase II is to return Iraq to a responsible role in the region. Were Iraq governed by a group representing no threat to its neighbors and willing to abandon its weapons of mass destruction, the stability of the region would be immeasurably enhanced. The remaining regimes flirting with terrorist fundamentalism or acquiescing in its exactions would be driven to shut down their support of terrorism.

At a minimum, we should insist on a U.N. inspection system to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, with an unlimited right of inspection and freedom of movement for the inspectors. But no such system exists on paper, and the effort to install it might be identical with that required to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Above all, given the ease of producing biological and chemical weapons, inspection must be extremely intrusive, and experience shows that no inspection can withstand indefinitely the opposition of a determined host government.

But if the overthrow of Saddam Hussein is to be seriously considered, three prerequisites must be met: (a) development of a military plan that is quick and decisive, (b) some prior agreement on what kind of structure is to replace Hussein and (c) the support or acquiescence of key countries needed for implementation of the military plan.

A military operation against Saddam Hussein cannot be long and drawn out. If it is, the battle may turn into a struggle of Islam against the West. It would also enable Hussein to try to involve Israel by launching attacks on it — perhaps using chemical and biological weapons — in the process sowing confusion within the Muslim world. A long war extending to six months and beyond would also make it more difficult to keep allies and countries such as Russia and China from dissociating formally from what they are unlikely to join but even more unlikely to oppose.

Before proceeding to confrontation with Iraq, the Bush administration will therefore wish to examine with great care the military strategy implied. Forces of the magnitude of the Gulf War of a decade ago are unlikely to be needed. At the same time, it would be dangerous to rely on a combination of U.S. air power and indigenous opposition forces alone. To be sure, the contemporary precision weaponry was not available in the existing quantities during the Gulf War. And the no-fly zones will make Iraqi reinforcements difficult. They could be strengthened by being turned into no- movement zones proscribing the movement of particular categories of weapons.

Still, we cannot stake American national security entirely, or even largely, on local opposition forces that do not yet exist and whose combat capabilities are untested. Perhaps Iraqi forces would collapse at the first confrontation, as some argue. But the likelihood of this happening is greatly increased if it is clear American military power stands in overwhelming force immediately behind the local forces.

A second prerequisite for a military campaign against Iraq is to define the political outcome. Local opposition would in all likelihood be sustained by the Kurdish minority in the north and the Shiite majority in the south. But if we are to enlist the Sunni minority, which now dominates Iraq, in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, we need to make clear that Iraq's disintegration is not the goal of American policy. This is all the more important because a military operation in Iraq would require the support of Turkey and the acquiescence of Saudi Arabia. Neither is likely to cooperate if they foresee an independent Kurdish state in the north and a Shiite republic in the south as the probable outcome. A Kurdish state would inflame the Kurdish minority in Turkey and a Shiite state in the south would threaten the Dhahran region in Saudi Arabia, and might give Iran a new base to seek to dominate the gulf region. A federal structure for a unified Iraq would be a way to deal with this issue.

Creating an appropriate coalition for such an effort and finding bases for the necessary American deployment will be difficult. Phase II is likely to separate those members of the coalition that joined so as to have veto over American actions from those that are willing to pursue an implacable strategy. Nevertheless, the skillful diplomacy that shaped the first phase of the anti-terrorism campaign would have much to build on. Saddam Hussein has no friends in the gulf region. Britain will not easily abandon the pivotal role, based on its special relationship with the United States, that it has earned for itself in the evolution of the crisis. Nor will Germany move into active opposition to the United States — especially in an election year. The same is true of Russia, China and Japan. A determined American policy thus has more latitude than is generally assumed.

But it will be far more difficult than Phase I. Local resistance — especially in Iraq — will be more determined and ruthless. Domestic opposition will mount in many countries. American public opinion will be crucial in sustaining such a course. It will need to be shaped by the same kind of decisive and subtle leadership by which President Bush unified the country for the first phase of the crisis.

03

廣而告之

（2025年3月10日）

全球視野，青年視角，大外交青年智庫（GDYT）小紅書，用獨特觀點解讀世界風(fēng)云 。

04

東盟觀察

駐宋卡總領(lǐng)事汪志堅會見泰國南方大學(xué)人文學(xué)院院長

2025年3月5日，駐宋卡總領(lǐng)事汪志堅會見泰國南方大學(xué)人文學(xué)院院長巴麗恰一行。巴介紹學(xué)校學(xué)科特長及課程設(shè)置、留學(xué)生規(guī)模、對華合作開展情況，邀請總領(lǐng)事走訪學(xué)校并面向中文專業(yè)學(xué)生開展主題演講等活動。雙方并就留學(xué)生簽證辦理等具體問題進行交流。

05

《論領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力》

作者：〔美國〕亨利·基辛格

譯者：胡利平 林華

出版社：中信出版社

06

蓋觀定論

07

大外交青年智庫（簡稱“大外交智庫”）（Glory Diplomacy Youth Think-tank，Glory Diplomacy或GDYT）是一家創(chuàng)辦于2017年的以外交安全為主的綜合性戰(zhàn)略研究機構(gòu)、社會/青年智庫，總部在中國深圳，是深圳首家非官方外交安全智庫、中國首家青年智庫，創(chuàng)始人是王蓋蓋。GDYT一直堅持“只有修煉好內(nèi)功，才能放心去實戰(zhàn)”的發(fā)展理念，從2017年創(chuàng)始初期穩(wěn)扎穩(wěn)打，于2018年成立青年原創(chuàng)評論組（于2022年改組為《智本青析》編輯部）并創(chuàng)辦《智本青析》電子刊至今；2019年在海南開設(shè)分支機構(gòu)即海南大外交學(xué)會（GDYT HN），同年成立青年發(fā)展研究院，該中心在2019年創(chuàng)辦“大外交青年發(fā)展與實踐啟航項目”研修班至今，在2021年創(chuàng)辦“世界青年菁英坊《早點知道》講座項目”至今；2020年成立應(yīng)試就業(yè)研究院并創(chuàng)辦《真題解析》付費專欄；同年7月，成立外交外事涉外安全決策咨詢公司，集中研究國家安全與國際安全、海外利益分析與保護、青年外交與青年發(fā)展、區(qū)域國別與國際組織、跨國公司與全球治理等事務(wù)；2021年成立外文編譯評議組并創(chuàng)辦《大譯編參》電子刊至今（該編輯部于2022年創(chuàng)辦《每日信報》微電子日刊），同年成立區(qū)域國別研究院（該院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《新國別簡報》欄目）；2022年成立世界外交數(shù)據(jù)中心、全球治理研究院（該院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《鴻士論天下》欄目）、國家安全研究院、黨的理論創(chuàng)新研究中心，并合并所有專訪項目（青坊談、最有影響力人物訪談、21世紀(jì)中國外交天團、學(xué)人專訪等）整合為《與名人對話》欄目，組建“青年智庫特種部隊”全職高精尖部門（該部門于2023年創(chuàng)辦《中華內(nèi)參》內(nèi)刊）和全球范圍內(nèi)的“大中華菁英圈”（該共同體于2024年創(chuàng)辦《全球統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)》內(nèi)刊），開啟“Smallibrary·小書屋”全球青年閱讀挑戰(zhàn)計劃（該計劃于2022年創(chuàng)辦《智庫書屋》欄目），運營新知太學(xué)（網(wǎng)絡(luò)）書院（該書院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《線上共讀》欄目）；2023年，成立全球創(chuàng)業(yè)研究中心、全球灣區(qū)研究院、跨國公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心、數(shù)字經(jīng)濟研究院、海洋治理研究中心、基式外交研究中心，在香港開設(shè)分支機構(gòu)“香港大外交學(xué)會（GDYT HK）”，創(chuàng)辦“華灣國際創(chuàng)業(yè)發(fā)展新菁英匯”國際人才交流平臺，創(chuàng)辦“灣山友（WSY）”戶外爬山徒步讀書研討國際精英俱樂部；2024年，成立新型智庫研究院、企業(yè)出海研究院（整合全球創(chuàng)業(yè)研究中心、跨國公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心等三大中心于一體）、“荔林讀書會（LOC）”（整合“國關(guān)讀書會”“華灣讀書會”“灣山友讀書會”“全球4%讀書會”等四大讀書會于一體）等。GDYT從2021年以來，多次舉辦全國（含全球）青年國際問題學(xué)術(shù)研討、思想交流、政策分析與企業(yè)出海等活動，如“國際問題研究型青年智庫發(fā)展模式探索論壇”、“新型國際問題青年智庫建設(shè)與發(fā)展論壇”、“國際關(guān)系青年辯論賽”、“國際關(guān)系青年辯論賽最佳辯手論壇”、“世界青年菁英坊《早點知道》系列講座”、“國際問題/區(qū)域國別學(xué)術(shù)研討會（GDYT·ISAS）”系列活動、“《與名人對話》系列采訪活動”、“《鴻士論天下》系列講座活動”、“新時代中國國際戰(zhàn)略高端論壇與菁英論壇”、“華灣國際創(chuàng)業(yè)發(fā)展新菁英匯”系列活動、“GDYT與國際知名學(xué)者對話”、“灣山友俱樂部粵港澳國際精英戶外實踐交流”系列活動、“荔林讀書會”國際前沿思想沙龍等等。自創(chuàng)辦以來，GDYT一直致力于“讓壹億中國大外交青年智慧與方案被全球看見”，聚集全球各地有志青年為實現(xiàn)個人、企業(yè)、社會、國家和世界和平發(fā)展而奮斗，至2021年底，已發(fā)展成集專家顧問、研究員（含高級）、特約研究員（含高級）、助理研究員、編譯評議員、時政評論員、實習(xí)生、志愿者等全方位國際人才體系（200人）的樣本標(biāo)桿青年智庫，聚焦中國與全球大外交領(lǐng)域青年的原創(chuàng)方案、發(fā)展計劃和外交延伸等助力與服務(wù)，在“對照全球外交發(fā)展、對接世界高端智庫、對比新型平臺建設(shè)”的三原則指導(dǎo)下，為中國的外交與安全發(fā)展貢獻青年力量和方案，為中央及地方政府部門提供內(nèi)參、為企業(yè)國內(nèi)外發(fā)展提供商業(yè)咨詢、為國際問題智庫建設(shè)提供調(diào)研路徑、為非政府組織及個人提供咨詢等服務(wù)，被海內(nèi)外青年譽為現(xiàn)代智囊的“青年精英大腦集中營、集散地”，是全球新型外交青年智庫的開創(chuàng)者和代言人！