大外交青年智庫·深圳

Glory Diplomacy

讓中國外交青年智慧被全球看見

為中國青年智庫代言

大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心

作者：亨利?A?基辛格

譯者：大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心

來源：《基式外交研究》2025年第24期“經(jīng)典文獻重譯”專欄文章

審定：基式外交研究中心學(xué)術(shù)委員會

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "Deal With Tehran, Not Its Crusade." The Washington Post, November 24, 2006.

聲明：基式外交研究中心轉(zhuǎn)載、編譯與翻譯的內(nèi)容均為非商業(yè)性引用（學(xué)術(shù)研究），不作商用，版權(quán)歸原作者所有。如有問題請即刻聯(lián)系，如需轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處

郵箱：fydwjzhuanyong@126.com

一、中文

伊朗的核計劃及其豐富資源使其得以謀求地區(qū)戰(zhàn)略主導(dǎo)權(quán)。在激進什葉派意識形態(tài)的驅(qū)動下，以及通過對抗聯(lián)合國安理會決議的象征性姿態(tài)，伊朗正挑戰(zhàn)中東地區(qū)的既有秩序，并可能對所有伊斯蘭人口占少數(shù)的非伊斯蘭主導(dǎo)地區(qū)構(gòu)成沖擊。

國際社會訴諸外交手段化解危機的努力迄今收效甚微。為解決核問題設(shè)立的談判論壇正走向僵局，參與各方立場分歧導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)略方向模糊不清。

聯(lián)合國安理會五大常任理事國加德國（即“六國集團”）已提出一攬子激勵措施，要求其終止鈾濃縮活動——此舉被視為終結(jié)核武計劃的關(guān)鍵步驟。六國同時威脅，若伊朗拒絕提案則將實施制裁。伊朗堅持其鈾濃縮“權(quán)利”，引發(fā)六國集團內(nèi)部對制裁性質(zhì)的激烈辯論。就連歐洲“三國集團”（英、法、德）提出的最低限度制裁方案也遭俄羅斯否決。

美國因不愿與“邪惡軸心”國家直接談判，此前未參與相關(guān)協(xié)商。但國務(wù)卿康多莉扎?賴斯近期宣布政策轉(zhuǎn)向：若伊朗在談判期間暫停濃縮活動，美國及其本人將參與核談。

然而，德黑蘭至今對與美國在多邊框架內(nèi)或單獨談判均無興趣。究其根源，伊朗認(rèn)為放棄核大國訴求不符合其核心國家利益，而堅持該計劃則具備強大的國內(nèi)政治動力。推進核武計劃既可激發(fā)民族自豪感，亦能鞏固本已脆弱的國內(nèi)支持。六國提供的激勵方案，即便被伊朗采信，也將加劇其對本屆領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層所抵制的國際體系的依賴。

歐洲談判代表雖認(rèn)同防止核擴散的重要性，但其治下社會愈發(fā)不愿為未來利益承受當(dāng)下犧牲——國內(nèi)改革立法舉步維艱即為明證。歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人深知，公眾不會支持對伊動武，且在圍繞制裁的長期政治危機中，民意基礎(chǔ)恐將動搖。

美國的歐洲盟友選擇推行最低限度制裁，冀望六國聯(lián)合行動之事實能使伊朗決策層有所顧忌。部分歐洲外交官所持“伊朗不愿永為國際棄兒，終將妥協(xié)”之信念，恐屬一廂情愿。待此幻想破滅，歐洲盟友或被迫不情愿地升級制裁，直至伊朗采取對抗性回應(yīng)。彼時，各國將不得不在短期危機與放任伊朗核計劃導(dǎo)致的永久危機間作出抉擇。

漸進式施壓的困境在于：若初始措施力度不足（正是因此被選中），對手可能選擇等待下一輪制裁。最終，漸進主義反而可能加劇對抗，使本可避免的攤牌成為必然。

俄羅斯的立場更為復(fù)雜。或許沒有國家比俄羅斯更擔(dān)憂伊朗核能力——其龐大的伊斯蘭人口聚居區(qū)緊鄰伊朗北部邊境。俄羅斯也最易受伊朗核技術(shù)流入恐怖組織或受伊朗總統(tǒng)內(nèi)賈德鼓吹的圣戰(zhàn)主義思潮影響。因此，若無成功希望，俄羅斯不愿引火燒身。

此外，俄美關(guān)系已發(fā)生重大變化，戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系承諾減弱，雙方猜忌加深。美國擔(dān)憂俄羅斯在其所謂“近鄰國家”重建帝國影響力；俄羅斯則認(rèn)為美國試圖迫使克里姆林宮改變國內(nèi)政策并削弱其國際地位。

鑒于認(rèn)定伊朗將成為強大對手，且對美國在伊拉克的努力評價甚低，克里姆林宮懷疑美國是否有持久力與伊朗長期對抗，因而選擇避免獨自承擔(dān)對抗風(fēng)險。結(jié)果，莫斯科將重心轉(zhuǎn)向歐洲，并在伊朗問題上與歐洲持同樣猶豫態(tài)度。區(qū)別在于，若危機達到臨界點，尤其是當(dāng)伊朗核能力即將成為現(xiàn)實時，俄羅斯更可能采取堅定立場。

與伊朗的核談判正走向無果結(jié)局。六國最終必須選擇有效制裁，或接受伊朗軍事核能力及其引發(fā)的全球擴散后果。在國會敵對的總統(tǒng)任期最后兩年，美國發(fā)動軍事行動的可能性極低——盡管德黑蘭可能更嚴(yán)肅對待此威脅。若所有談判選項關(guān)閉，以色列單方面打擊的可能性不容小覷。

更可能的是，核問題將被納入基于地緣政治因素的更廣泛談判。但必須明確這一流行概念的內(nèi)涵。當(dāng)前普遍主張將伊朗（及敘利亞）納入談判進程，冀望其改變態(tài)度，如同當(dāng)年對華開放。據(jù)說，這將有助于美國戰(zhàn)略收縮至更可持續(xù)的位置。

將對手排除在外的外交本屬悖論。但支持談判的論點往往聚焦于開啟對話而非實質(zhì)內(nèi)容，假設(shè)談判本身即代表心理突破。然而，氣氛改善帶來的緩和注定短暫。外交——尤其與對手的外交——唯有實現(xiàn)利益平衡才能成功。否則，可能淪為拖延的借口，或緩解失敗進程的安慰劑，卻無法消除失敗后果。

當(dāng)年對華開放得益于蘇聯(lián)對中國北方邊境的軍事壓力；中美和解落實了雙方防止蘇聯(lián)霸權(quán)的共同利益。同理，中東穿梭外交取得進展，是因其建立在雙方均無法單方面改變的既存平衡之上。

若談判淪為目的本身，將出現(xiàn)無果論壇與拖延動機。若此類外交最終導(dǎo)致伊朗核能力坐大且其填補政治真空，中東秩序?qū)⒚媾R災(zāi)難性沖擊。

理解德黑蘭的世界觀對評估對話前景至關(guān)重要。內(nèi)賈德代表的思想流派可能認(rèn)為伊朗正迎來數(shù)個世紀(jì)以來最有利的戰(zhàn)略機遇：

伊拉克作為制衡力量崩潰，其什葉派武裝由曾在德黑蘭受訓(xùn)并流亡數(shù)十年的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人掌控；

伊拉克民主體制有利于什葉派多數(shù)派主導(dǎo)；

黎巴嫩真主黨在伊朗訓(xùn)練和支持下成為最強軍事力量。

面對日益崛起的什葉派地帶及其對沙特東北部和波斯灣沿岸什葉派民眾的吸引力，遜尼派國家（埃及、約旦、沙特）及海灣國家的態(tài)度從不安演變?yōu)槌跗诳只拧＿@或許能解釋內(nèi)賈德訪美時的傲慢言行，其核心似為：“勿與我談你們制定且我們不屑的世界秩序規(guī)則。從現(xiàn)在起，圣戰(zhàn)將定義或至少參與塑造規(guī)則。”

僅為與美國對話的機會無法改變此類態(tài)度。自信的伊朗領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人或會促成美國局部撤退，但以其當(dāng)前心態(tài)，此舉僅為將撤退演變?yōu)殚L期潰敗。認(rèn)為伊朗有興趣就伊拉克問題談判以避免邊境動蕩的論點，僅在美國保持控制混亂能力時成立。伊朗唯有兩個談判動機：出現(xiàn)使帝國主義政策無利可圖的地區(qū)架構(gòu)，或擔(dān)憂局勢失控引發(fā)美國打擊。

只要伊朗自視為圣戰(zhàn)運動而非國家實體，談判便無法催生共同利益。促使伊朗形成更平衡的認(rèn)知應(yīng)成為美國外交的重要目標(biāo)。伊朗或早或晚將明白，在可預(yù)見未來，作為相對貧窮的發(fā)展中國家，它無力挑戰(zhàn)所有工業(yè)化國家。但這一轉(zhuǎn)變需以美國及其盟友制定精確具體的戰(zhàn)略與談判方案為前提。

鑒于地區(qū)遜尼派國家對什葉派浪潮的恐懼，美伊談判可能引發(fā)先發(fā)制人讓步的連鎖反應(yīng)，除非提前或至少同步作出重大努力，團結(jié)這些國家推行平衡政策。在此政策框架內(nèi)，伊朗需獲得受尊重但非主導(dǎo)的地位。重啟巴勒斯坦和平進程應(yīng)在此設(shè)計中發(fā)揮重要作用，這要求美國、歐洲與溫和阿拉伯國家緊密合作。絕不可為緩解地緣壓力而默許伊朗軍事核計劃——此舉將抵押地區(qū)乃至全球秩序的未來。

須引導(dǎo)伊朗以國家而非革命事業(yè)之姿行事。除非美國保有填補真空之力或至少參與其中，否則伊朗無動機扮演“天外救星”助美脫困。美國需調(diào)整戰(zhàn)略部署，但若此舉被視為撤離中東的前奏，現(xiàn)有架構(gòu)恐將崩塌。

對伊朗實施目標(biāo)明確且具創(chuàng)造力的外交，對構(gòu)建更具希望的地區(qū)格局至關(guān)重要——但前提是伊朗未在此過程中形成獨掌未來的錯覺，或是新秩序的潛在構(gòu)件未因美國調(diào)整戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)而分崩離析。

二、英文

Iran's nuclear program and considerable resources enable it to strive for strategic dominance in its region. With the impetus of a radical Shiite ideology and the symbolism of defiance of the U.N. Security Council's resolution, Iran challenges the established order in the Middle East and perhaps wherever Islamic populations face dominant, non-Islamic majorities.

The appeal for diplomacy to overcome these dangers has so far proved futile. The negotiating forum the world has put in place for the nuclear issue is heading for a deadlock. Divisions among the negotiating partners inhibit a clear sense of direction.

The five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany — known as the "Six" — have submitted a package of incentives to get Tehran to end enrichment of uranium as a key step toward putting an end to the weapons program. They have threatened sanctions if their proposal is rejected. Iran has insisted on its "right" to proceed with enrichment, triggering an allied debate about the nature of the sanctions to which the Six have committed themselves. Even the minimal sanctions proposed by Europe's "E-3" (Britain, France and Germany) have been rejected by Russia.

Reluctant to negotiate directly with a member of the "axis of evil," the United States has not participated in the negotiations. But recently Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has announced a reversal of policy. The United States — and she herself — will participate in the nuclear talks, provided Iran suspends its enrichment program while discussions take place.

Tehran, however, has so far shown no interest in negotiating with the United States, either in the multilateral forum or separately. This is because Iran sees no compelling national interest in giving up its claim to nuclear power status, and strong domestic political reasons to persist. Pursuing the nuclear weapons program is a way of appealing to national pride, and it shores up otherwise shaky domestic support. The proposed incentives, even if they were believed, would increase Iran's dependence on the international system that Iran's current leaders reject.

The European negotiators accept the importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But they govern societies increasingly loath to make immediate sacrifices for the sake of the future — witness the difficulty of passing legislation on domestic reform. Europe's leaders know that their publics wouldn't support military action against Iran and would probably prove very shaky in a prolonged political crisis over sanctions.

America's European allies have decided to opt for minimum sanctions because they hope that the mere fact of united action by the Six will give Iran's leaders pause. The conviction expressed by some European diplomats that Iran will not wish to be a pariah nation indefinitely, and will therefore come to an agreement, is probably wishful thinking. As this becomes apparent, the European allies will probably move reluctantly toward escalation of sanctions, up to a point where Iran undertakes a confrontational response. Then they will have to choose between the immediate crisis and the permanent crisis of letting the Iranian nuclear program run free.

The dilemma is inherent in any gradual escalation. If initial steps are minimal, they are presumably endurable (and are indeed chosen for that reason). The adversary may be tempted to wait for the next increment. Thus gradualism may, in the end, promote escalation and make inevitable the very decision being evaded.

Russia's position is more complex. Probably no country — not even the United States — fears an Iranian nuclear capability more than Russia, whose large Islamic population lies just north of the Iranian border. No country is more exposed to the seepage of Iranian nuclear capabilities into terrorist hands or to the jihadist ideological wave that the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, encourages. For that reason, Russia does not want to unleash Iranian hostility on itself without a prospect of probable success.

In addition, Russian attitudes toward the United States have undergone a significant change. There is a lessened commitment to strategic partnership. Suspicion has grown on both sides. The United States fears that Russia is striving to rebuild its imperial influence in what Russia calls the "near-abroad"; Russia believes that America is seeking to pressure the Kremlin to change its domestic policies and to reduce Russia's international influence.

Because of its conviction that Iran will be a formidable adversary and its low assessment of the American effort in Iraq, the Kremlin doubts that the United States has the staying power for a prolonged confrontation with Iran and chooses to avoid manning barricades on which it might be left alone. In consequence, Moscow has shifted its emphasis toward Europe and, on Iran, shares Europe's hesitation. The difference is that if matters reach a final crunch, Russia is more likely to take a stand, especially when an Iranian nuclear capability begins to look inevitable and even more so when it emerges as imminent.

The nuclear negotiations with Iran are moving toward an inconclusive outcome. The Six eventually will have to choose either effective sanctions or the consequences of an Iranian military nuclear capability and the world of proliferation that implies. Military action by the United States is extremely improbable in the final two years of a presidency facing a hostile Congress — though it may be taken more seriously in Tehran. Tehran surely cannot ignore the possibility of a unilateral Israeli strike if all negotiation options close.

More likely, the nuclear issue will be absorbed into a more comprehensive negotiation based on geopolitical factors. It is important, however, to be clear as to what this increasingly fashionable term implies. The argument has become widespread that Iran (and Syria) should be drawn into a negotiating process in the hope of bringing about a change of their attitudes, as happened, for example, in the opening to China a generation ago. This, it is said, would facilitate a retreat by the United States to more strategically sustainable positions.

A diplomacy that excludes adversaries is a contradiction in terms. But the argument on behalf of negotiating focuses too often on the opening of talks rather than on their substance. The fact of talks is assumed to represent a psychological breakthrough. However, the relief supplied by a change of atmosphere is bound to be temporary. Diplomacy — especially with an adversary — can succeed only if it brings about a balance of interests. Failing that, it runs the risk of turning into an alibi for procrastination or a palliative to ease the process of defeat without, however, eliminating the consequences of defeat.

The opening to China was facilitated by Soviet military pressures on China's northern borders; rapprochement between the United States and China implemented an existing common interest in preventing Soviet hegemony. Similarly, the shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East made progress because it was built on a preexisting equilibrium that neither side was able to alter unilaterally.

To the extent that talk becomes its own objective, there will emerge forums without progress and incentives for stonewalling. If, at the end of such a diplomacy, stands an Iranian nuclear capability and a political vacuum being filled by Iran, the impact on order in the Middle East will be catastrophic.

Understanding the way Tehran views the world is crucial in assessing the prospects of a dialogue. The school of thought represented by President Ahmadinejad may well perceive Iranian prospects as more promising than they have been in centuries. Iraq has collapsed as a counterweight; within Iraq, Shiite forces are led by men who were trained in Tehran and spent decades there. Democratic institutions in Iraq favor dominance by the majority Shiite groups. In Lebanon, Hezbollah, trained and guided by Iran, is the strongest military force.

In the face of this looming Shiite belt and its appeal to the Shiite population in northeast Saudi Arabia and along the Persian Gulf, attitudes in the Sunni states — Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia — and the Gulf states range from unease to incipient panic. This may explain Ahmadinejad's insolent behavior during his visit to New York. His theme seemed to be: "Don't talk to me about your world order, whose rules we did not participate in making and which we disdain. From now on, jihad will define the rules or at least participate in shaping them."

These attitudes will not be changed simply for the opportunity of talking to the United States. The self-confident Iranian leaders may facilitate a local American retreat but, in their present mood, only for the purpose of turning it into a long-term rout. The argument that Iran has an interest in negotiating over Iraq to avoid chaos along its borders is valid only as long as the United States retains a capacity to help control the chaos. There are only two incentives for Iran to negotiate: the emergence of a regional structure that makes imperialist policies unattractive and the concern that, if matters are pushed too far, America might yet strike out.

So long as Iran views itself as a crusade rather than a nation, a common interest will not emerge from negotiations. To evoke a more balanced view should be an important goal for U.S. diplomacy. Iran may come to understand sooner or later that, for the foreseeable future, it is a relatively poor developing country in no position to challenge all the industrialized nations. But such an evolution presupposes the development of a precise and concrete strategic and negotiating program by the United States and its associates.

With the Sunni states of the region terrified by the Shiite wave, negotiation between Iran and the United States could generate a stampede toward preemptive concessions, unless preceded, or at least accompanied, by a significant effort to rally those states to a policy of equilibrium. In such a policy, Iran must find a respected, but not dominant, place. A restarted Palestinian peace process should play a significant role in that design, which presupposes close cooperation among the United States, Europe and the moderate Arab states. What must not happen is to trade relief from geopolitical pressures for acquiescence in an Iranian military nuclear program. That would mortgage the future, not only for the region but for the entire global order.

Iran needs to be encouraged to act as a nation, not a cause. It has no incentive to appear as a deus ex machina to enable America to escape its embarrassments, unless the United States retains an ability to fill the vacuum or at least be a factor in filling it. America will need to reposition its strategic deployments, but if such actions are viewed as the prelude to an exit from the region, a collapse of existing structures is probable.

A purposeful and creative diplomacy toward Iran is important for building a more promising region — but only if Iran does not, in the process, come to believe that it is able to shape the future on its own or if the potential building blocks of a new order disintegrate while America sorts out its purposes.

三、譯文拾貝

strategic dominance

中文解釋：戰(zhàn)略主導(dǎo)地位，通過軍事、經(jīng)濟或政治手段在特定區(qū)域建立的優(yōu)勢地位，如美國在亞太地區(qū)的軍事存在。

英文原句："Iran's nuclear program and considerable resources enable it to strive for strategic dominance in its region."

radical Shiite ideology

中文解釋：激進什葉派意識形態(tài)，以極端什葉派教義為核心的政治思想，主張通過暴力對抗實現(xiàn)伊斯蘭革命目標(biāo)，如伊朗伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊的行動綱領(lǐng)。

英文原句："With the impetus of a radical Shiite ideology and the symbolism of defiance..."

U.N. Security Council's resolution

中文解釋：聯(lián)合國安理會決議，聯(lián)合國安理會依據(jù)《憲章》第七章通過的強制性文件，違反者可能面臨制裁（如第 2231 號決議限制伊朗核活動）。

英文原句："defiance of the U.N. Security Council's resolution"

negotiating forum

中文解釋：談判論壇，為解決爭端設(shè)立的多邊協(xié)商機制，如六方會談（Six-Party Talks）旨在解決朝鮮核問題。

英文原句："The negotiating forum the world has put in place for the nuclear issue..."

Six

中文解釋：六國集團，由安理會五常（美、俄、中、英、法）加德國組成的非正式機制，專門處理伊朗核問題。

英文原句："The five permanent members... plus Germany — known as the 'Six'"

package of incentives

中文解釋：一攬子激勵措施，包含經(jīng)濟援助、技術(shù)合作等內(nèi)容的綜合性方案，如 2015 年《聯(lián)合全面行動計劃》對伊朗的制裁解除承諾。

英文原句："submitted a package of incentives to get Tehran to end enrichment"

sanctions

中文解釋：制裁，通過限制貿(mào)易、凍結(jié)資產(chǎn)等手段施加壓力，如美國對伊朗實施的石油禁運（次級制裁）。

英文原句："They have threatened sanctions if their proposal is rejected."

axis of evil

中文解釋：邪惡軸心，小布什政府提出的地緣政治概念，指支持恐怖主義的國家（伊朗、伊拉克、朝鮮），反映單邊主義外交思維。

英文原句："Reluctant to negotiate directly with a member of the 'axis of evil'"

nuclear power status

中文解釋：核大國地位，國際社會對擁有核武器國家的承認(rèn)，如《不擴散核武器條約》（NPT）定義的“核武器國家”（NWS）。

英文原句："giving up its claim to nuclear power status"

domestic political reasons

中文解釋：國內(nèi)政治因素，影響外交決策的國內(nèi)變量，如伊朗保守派與改革派的權(quán)力斗爭影響核政策走向。

英文原句："strong domestic political reasons to persist"

military action

中文解釋：軍事行動，包括軍事打擊、威懾等手段，如美國 2020 年對伊朗將軍蘇萊曼尼的無人機襲擊。

英文原句："Europe's publics wouldn't support military action against Iran"

minimum sanctions

中文解釋：最低限度制裁，針對特定領(lǐng)域的有限制裁，如歐盟對伊朗實施的旅行禁令和資產(chǎn)凍結(jié)。

英文原句："America's European allies have decided to opt for minimum sanctions"

wishful thinking

中文解釋：一廂情愿，基于主觀臆斷而非現(xiàn)實的政策預(yù)期，如認(rèn)為經(jīng)濟制裁必然導(dǎo)致政權(quán)更迭。

英文原句："is probably wishful thinking"

gradual escalation

中文解釋：逐步升級，通過分階段施壓迫使對方讓步，如美國對伊朗“極限施壓”策略的演變。

英文原句："The dilemma is inherent in any gradual escalation."

strategic partnership

中文解釋：戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系，基于共同利益的長期合作，如中俄全面戰(zhàn)略協(xié)作伙伴關(guān)系。

英文原句："lessened commitment to strategic partnership"

near-abroad

中文解釋：近鄰國家，俄羅斯對獨聯(lián)體國家的地緣政治表述，反映其傳統(tǒng)勢力范圍認(rèn)知。

英文原句："rebuild its imperial influence in what Russia calls the 'near-abroad'"

final crunch

中文解釋：最后關(guān)頭，危機的決定性階段，如古巴導(dǎo)彈危機期間美蘇的核攤牌時刻。

英文原句："if matters reach a final crunch"

inconclusive outcome

中文解釋：無結(jié)果的結(jié)局，談判未能達成協(xié)議，如 2019 年伊核協(xié)議談判破裂后的僵局。

英文原句："The nuclear negotiations... are moving toward an inconclusive outcome."

unilateral Israeli strike

中文解釋：以色列單方面打擊，未經(jīng)國際授權(quán)的軍事行動，如以色列對伊朗核設(shè)施的“果園行動”（2007 年）。

英文原句："the possibility of a unilateral Israeli strike"

geopolitical factors

中文解釋：地緣政治因素，影響國家戰(zhàn)略的地理、資源等要素，如馬六甲海峽對中美貿(mào)易的戰(zhàn)略意義。

英文原句："based on geopolitical factors"

opening to China

中文解釋：對華開放，1972 年尼克松訪華打破中美僵局，體現(xiàn)現(xiàn)實主義外交的均勢邏輯。

英文原句："as happened... in the opening to China a generation ago"

balance of interests

中文解釋：利益平衡，外交談判的核心原則，如《中導(dǎo)條約》通過限制美蘇導(dǎo)彈數(shù)量實現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略平衡。

英文原句："Diplomacy... can succeed only if it brings about a balance of interests."

Soviet military pressures

中文解釋：蘇聯(lián)軍事壓力，冷戰(zhàn)期間蘇聯(lián)在中蘇邊境陳兵百萬，直接推動中美關(guān)系正常化。

英文原句："Soviet military pressures on China's northern borders"

rapprochement

中文解釋：和解，敵對國家關(guān)系緩和，如 1987 年美蘇《中導(dǎo)條約》簽署后的“新思維”外交。

英文原句："rapprochement between the United States and China"

shuttle diplomacy

中文解釋：穿梭外交，第三方斡旋者往返協(xié)調(diào)，如基辛格 1973 年促成第四次中東戰(zhàn)爭停火。

英文原句："the shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East"

preexisting equilibrium

中文解釋：既存平衡，談判前已形成的穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)，如印巴核威懾下的克什米爾僵局。

英文原句："built on a preexisting equilibrium"

forums without progress

中文解釋：無果論壇，缺乏實質(zhì)成果的多邊機制，如聯(lián)合國氣候變化框架公約下的多次無果談判。

英文原句："there will emerge forums without progress"

stonewalling

中文解釋：拖延戰(zhàn)術(shù)，弱勢方常用策略，如朝鮮在六方會談中多次以退會拖延談判。

英文原句："incentives for stonewalling"

Shiite belt

中文解釋：什葉派地帶，從伊朗延伸至伊拉克、敘利亞、黎巴嫩的什葉派聚居區(qū)，形成地緣政治聯(lián)盟。

英文原句："looming Shiite belt"

Sunni states

中文解釋：遜尼派國家，以遜尼派為主體的伊斯蘭國家，如沙特阿拉伯、埃及，與什葉派國家存在教派矛盾。

英文原句："attitudes in the Sunni states — Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia"

jihad

中文解釋：圣戰(zhàn)，伊斯蘭教法中的“奮斗”，極端組織曲解為針對異教徒的暴力行動。

英文原句："jihad will define the rules"

imperialist policies

中文解釋：帝國主義政策，通過軍事擴張、經(jīng)濟控制建立霸權(quán)，如 19 世紀(jì)英國殖民體系。

英文原句："makes imperialist policies unattractive"

preemptive concessions

中文解釋：先發(fā)制人讓步，危機前主動妥協(xié)以避免沖突，如 2013 年伊朗魯哈尼政府暫停鈾濃縮。

英文原句："generate a stampede toward preemptive concessions"

moderate Arab states

中文解釋：溫和阿拉伯國家，主張與西方合作的阿拉伯國家，如阿聯(lián)酋、巴林，與激進勢力形成對比。

英文原句："close cooperation among... the moderate Arab states"

deus ex machina

中文解釋：天外救星，突然介入解決危機的外部力量，如美國在海灣戰(zhàn)爭中對科威特的軍事干預(yù)。

英文原句："no incentive to appear as a deus ex machina"

strategic deployments

中文解釋：戰(zhàn)略部署，軍事力量的前沿配置，如美國在亞太地區(qū)的“島鏈”部署。

英文原句："reposition its strategic deployments"

global order

中文解釋：全球秩序，由國際規(guī)則和權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)構(gòu)成的治理體系，如二戰(zhàn)后的自由主義國際秩序。

英文原句："mortgage the future... for the entire global order"

Palestinian peace process

中文解釋：巴勒斯坦和平進程，旨在解決巴以沖突的多邊談判，包括“兩國方案”等核心議題。

英文原句："A restarted Palestinian peace process should play a significant role"

geopolitical pressures

中文解釋：地緣政治壓力，因地理位置產(chǎn)生的戰(zhàn)略競爭，如中印在喜馬拉雅地區(qū)的領(lǐng)土爭端。

英文原句："trade relief from geopolitical pressures"

military nuclear capability

中文解釋：軍事核能力，核武器研發(fā)、生產(chǎn)和投放能力，如朝鮮通過多次核試驗獲得的威懾力。

英文原句："acquiescence in an Iranian military nuclear program"

international system

中文解釋：國際體系，主權(quán)國家互動形成的結(jié)構(gòu)，如威斯特伐利亞體系下的均勢邏輯。

英文原句："increase Iran's dependence on the international system"

domestic reform

中文解釋：國內(nèi)改革，經(jīng)濟或政治體制調(diào)整，如伊朗 2013 年魯哈尼政府推動的開放政策。

英文原句："difficulty of passing legislation on domestic reform"

prolonged political crisis

中文解釋：長期政治危機，因體制缺陷或政策分歧導(dǎo)致的持續(xù)動蕩，如委內(nèi)瑞拉的政治經(jīng)濟危機。

英文原句："prove very shaky in a prolonged political crisis"

regional structure

中文解釋：地區(qū)架構(gòu)，區(qū)域合作機制，如非洲聯(lián)盟（AU）促進非洲一體化進程。

英文原句："emergence of a regional structure"

counterweight

中文解釋：制衡力量，維持權(quán)力平衡的國家或集團，如冷戰(zhàn)時期中國在美蘇之間的戰(zhàn)略作用。

英文原句："Iraq has collapsed as a counterweight"

democratic institutions

中文解釋：民主體制，通過選舉和分權(quán)保障公民權(quán)利的制度，如印度的議會民主制。

英文原句："Democratic institutions in Iraq favor dominance"

Hezbollah

中文解釋：真主黨，黎巴嫩什葉派武裝組織，被美國列為恐怖組織，參與敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)。

英文原句："Hezbollah... is the strongest military force"

incipient panic

中文解釋：初期恐慌，危機初期的群體性焦慮，如 2008 年金融危機時的市場恐慌。

英文原句："range from unease to incipient panic"

insolent behavior

中文解釋：傲慢行為，違反外交禮儀的挑釁舉動，如伊朗總統(tǒng)內(nèi)賈德否認(rèn)大屠殺的言論。

英文原句："Ahmadinejad's insolent behavior during his visit to New York"

大外交青年智庫（簡稱“大外交智庫”）（Glory Diplomacy Youth Think-tank，Glory Diplomacy或GDYT）是一家創(chuàng)辦于2017年的以外交安全為主的綜合性戰(zhàn)略研究機構(gòu)、社會/青年智庫，總部在中國深圳，是深圳首家非官方外交安全智庫、中國首家青年智庫，創(chuàng)始人是王蓋蓋。GDYT一直堅持“只有修煉好內(nèi)功，才能放心去實戰(zhàn)”的發(fā)展理念，從2017年創(chuàng)始初期穩(wěn)扎穩(wěn)打，于2018年成立青年原創(chuàng)評論組（于2022年改組為《智本青析》編輯部）并創(chuàng)辦《智本青析》電子刊至今；2019年在海南開設(shè)分支機構(gòu)即海南大外交學(xué)會（GDYT HN），同年成立青年發(fā)展研究院，該中心在2019年創(chuàng)辦“大外交青年發(fā)展與實踐啟航項目”研修班至今，在2021年創(chuàng)辦“世界青年菁英坊《早點知道》講座項目”至今；2020年成立應(yīng)試就業(yè)研究院并創(chuàng)辦《真題解析》付費專欄；同年7月，成立外交外事涉外安全決策咨詢公司，集中研究國家安全與國際安全、海外利益分析與保護、青年外交與青年發(fā)展、區(qū)域國別與國際組織、跨國公司與全球治理等事務(wù)；2021年成立外文編譯評議組并創(chuàng)辦《大譯編參》電子刊至今（該編輯部于2022年創(chuàng)辦《每日信報》微電子日刊），同年成立區(qū)域國別研究院（該院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《新國別簡報》欄目）；2022年成立世界外交數(shù)據(jù)中心、全球治理研究院（該院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《鴻士論天下》欄目）、國家安全研究院、黨的理論創(chuàng)新研究中心，并合并所有專訪項目（青坊談、最有影響力人物訪談、21世紀(jì)中國外交天團、學(xué)人專訪等）整合為《與名人對話》欄目，組建“青年智庫特種部隊”全職高精尖部門（該部門于2023年創(chuàng)辦《中華內(nèi)參》內(nèi)刊）和全球范圍內(nèi)的“大中華菁英圈”（該共同體于2024年創(chuàng)辦《全球統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)》內(nèi)刊），開啟“Smallibrary·小書屋”全球青年閱讀挑戰(zhàn)計劃（該計劃于2022年創(chuàng)辦《智庫書屋》欄目），運營新知太學(xué)（網(wǎng)絡(luò)）書院（該書院于2022年創(chuàng)辦《線上共讀》欄目）；2023年，成立全球創(chuàng)業(yè)研究中心、全球灣區(qū)研究院、跨國公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心、數(shù)字經(jīng)濟研究院、海洋治理研究中心、基式外交研究中心，在香港開設(shè)分支機構(gòu)“香港大外交學(xué)會（GDYT HK）”，創(chuàng)辦“華灣國際創(chuàng)業(yè)發(fā)展新菁英匯”國際人才交流平臺，創(chuàng)辦“灣山友（WSY）”戶外爬山徒步讀書研討國際精英俱樂部；2024年，成立新型智庫研究院、企業(yè)出海研究院（整合全球創(chuàng)業(yè)研究中心、跨國公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心等三大中心于一體）、“荔林讀書會（LOC）”（整合“國關(guān)讀書會”“華灣讀書會”“灣山友讀書會”“全球4%讀書會”等四大讀書會于一體）等。GDYT從2021年以來，多次舉辦全國（含全球）青年國際問題學(xué)術(shù)研討、思想交流、政策分析與企業(yè)出海等活動，如“國際問題研究型青年智庫發(fā)展模式探索論壇”、“新型國際問題青年智庫建設(shè)與發(fā)展論壇”、“國際關(guān)系青年辯論賽”、“國際關(guān)系青年辯論賽最佳辯手論壇”、“世界青年菁英坊《早點知道》系列講座”、“國際問題/區(qū)域國別學(xué)術(shù)研討會（GDYT·ISAS）”系列活動、“《與名人對話》系列采訪活動”、“《鴻士論天下》系列講座活動”、“新時代中國國際戰(zhàn)略高端論壇與菁英論壇”、“華灣國際創(chuàng)業(yè)發(fā)展新菁英匯”系列活動、“GDYT與國際知名學(xué)者對話”、“灣山友俱樂部粵港澳國際精英戶外實踐交流”系列活動、“荔林讀書會”國際前沿思想沙龍等等。自創(chuàng)辦以來，GDYT一直致力于“讓壹億中國大外交青年智慧與方案被全球看見”，聚集全球各地有志青年為實現(xiàn)個人、企業(yè)、社會、國家和世界和平發(fā)展而奮斗，至2021年底，已發(fā)展成集專家顧問、研究員（含高級）、特約研究員（含高級）、助理研究員、編譯評議員、時政評論員、實習(xí)生、志愿者等全方位國際人才體系（200人）的樣本標(biāo)桿青年智庫，聚焦中國與全球大外交領(lǐng)域青年的原創(chuàng)方案、發(fā)展計劃和外交延伸等助力與服務(wù)，在“對照全球外交發(fā)展、對接世界高端智庫、對比新型平臺建設(shè)”的三原則指導(dǎo)下，為中國的外交與安全發(fā)展貢獻青年力量和方案，為中央及地方政府部門提供內(nèi)參、為企業(yè)國內(nèi)外發(fā)展提供商業(yè)咨詢、為國際問題智庫建設(shè)提供調(diào)研路徑、為非政府組織及個人提供咨詢等服務(wù)，被海內(nèi)外青年譽為現(xiàn)代智囊的“青年精英大腦集中營、集散地”，是全球新型外交青年智庫的開創(chuàng)者和代言人！