大外交青年智庫·深圳
Glory Diplomacy
讓中國外交青年智慧被全球看見
為中國青年智庫代言
大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心
作者:亨利?A?基辛格
譯者:大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心
來源:《基式外交研究》2025年第25期“經典文獻重譯”專欄文章
審定:基式外交研究中心學術委員會
文源:Kissinger, Henry A. "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons." The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007.
聲明:基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用(學術研究),不作商用,版權歸原作者所有。如有問題請即刻聯系,如需轉載請注明出處
郵箱:fydwjzhuanyong@126.com
一、中文
核武器在當今世界構成巨大威脅,但也帶來了歷史性機遇。美國必須發揮領導作用,推動國際社會達成堅實共識:全球范圍內扭轉對核武器的依賴——這對防止核武器擴散至潛在危險勢力至關重要,并將最終消除其對世界的威脅。
冷戰期間,核武器作為威懾手段對維護國際安全具有核心作用。隨著冷戰終結,美蘇相互威懾理論已然過時。雖然威懾戰略仍是許多國家應對他國威脅的考量要素,但依賴核武器實施威懾的做法正變得愈發危險且效力日減。
朝鮮近期核試驗與伊朗拒絕停止鈾濃縮計劃(可能提升至武器級)表明,世界正瀕臨危險的新核時代的邊緣。最令人憂慮的是,非國家恐怖主義組織獲取核武器的可能性與日俱增。在恐怖主義勢力發動的全球秩序之戰中,核武器是實施大規模毀滅的終極手段。從戰略概念而言,擁有核武器的非國家恐怖組織不受傳統威懾戰略約束,這為國際安全帶來了前所未有的嚴峻挑戰。
除恐怖主義威脅外,若不采取新的緊急行動,美國將被迫進入一個比冷戰威懾時期更不穩定、更具心理顛覆性且經濟代價更沉重的新核時代。面對全球范圍內不斷增多的潛在核敵對國家,我們能否在不顯著增加核武器使用風險的前提下,成功復制美蘇舊有的“相互確保摧毀”機制?新晉核國家缺乏冷戰時期逐步建立的安全保障機制,難以及時防范核事故、誤判或未經授權發射。美蘇從非致命性錯誤中汲取經驗,雙方以高度審慎確保冷戰期間核武器未因蓄意或意外而被使用。新興核國家乃至整個國際社會,能否在未來五十年延續這般幸運?
歷代領導人始終關注此議題。1953年,德懷特·艾森豪威爾在聯合國“原子能為和平服務”演說中承諾,美國“決心幫助解決可怕的原子困境——全心全意尋找途徑,使人類的非凡創造力不再用于毀滅,而是致力于生命延續”。約翰·肯尼迪為打破核裁軍僵局疾呼:“這個世界不應成為人類等待行刑的牢獄。”
1988年6月9日,拉吉夫·甘地在聯合國大會發出警示:“核戰爭不僅意味著上億乃至十億人的死亡,更將導致四十億生靈滅絕——我們所知的地球生命將就此終結。我們來到聯合國尋求支持,懇請國際社會制止這種瘋狂行徑?!?/p>
羅納德·里根呼吁廢除“所有核武器”,他認為這種武器“完全非理性、徹底反人道,除殺戮外別無用途,足以摧毀地球生命與文明”。米哈伊爾·戈爾巴喬夫亦持有相同觀點,這與此前多位美國總統的立場不謀而合。
盡管雷克雅未克會晤未能達成全面廢除核武器的協議,但里根與戈爾巴喬夫成功扭轉了軍備競賽方向。他們啟動的削減戰略促成部署中的長程和中程核力量大幅縮減,包括徹底銷毀一類極具威脅的導彈。
如何重燃里根與戈爾巴喬夫的共同愿景?能否凝聚全球共識,制定切實可行的分階段核威脅削減方案?這兩個問題的解決已迫在眉睫。
《不擴散核武器條約》(NPT)以最終消除所有核武器為宗旨,規定:(一)1967年前未擁核國家承諾不獲取核武器;(二)擁核國家承諾逐步解除核武裝。自理查德·尼克松以來,歷屆兩黨總統均重申此項條約義務,但無核國家對核大國的誠意疑慮日增。
當前強力的防擴散機制正在運行:合作削減威脅計劃、全球威脅削減倡議、防擴散安全倡議及附加議定書等創新機制,為偵測違反NPT及危害國際安全的活動提供了有效工具,應予以全面落實。安理會常任理事國及德日參與的朝核、伊核問題談判至關重要,必須持續推進。
但僅憑現有措施尚不足以應對威脅。二十年前雷克雅未克峰會上,里根與戈爾巴喬夫曾懷揣更宏大的目標——徹底消除核武器。他們的愿景雖沖擊了核威懾理論界,卻點燃了全球民眾的希望。兩個最大核武庫國家的領導人,竟探討廢除其最強大的武器。
當前應采取何種行動?NPT的承諾與雷克雅未克的構想能否實現?我們認為,美國應主導開展重大行動,通過具體階段實現積極目標。
首要任務是與擁核國家領導人開展密集磋商,將無核世界目標轉化為共同事業。這種以改變擁核國家核態勢為基礎的合作,將強化現有防擴散努力,有效遏制朝鮮、伊朗核武裝化進程。
應尋求達成協議的方案須包含系列緊急措施,為消除核威脅奠定基礎:
·調整冷戰時期部署核武器的警戒狀態,延長預警時間,降低核武器意外或未經授權使用的風險
·持續推進各擁核國家核武庫實質性裁減
·消除設計用于前沿部署的短程核武器
·啟動參議院兩黨協商程序,建立信任機制并實施定期審查,利用最新技術成果推動《全面禁止核試驗條約》獲批,并促使其他關鍵國家完成批約
·為全球范圍內所有核武器、武器級钚及高濃鈾儲備建立最高安全標準
·建立鈾濃縮管控機制,配合核供應國集團及國際原子能機構(IAEA)等國際監管儲備,保障核電反應堆鈾燃料的合理價格獲取。同時須解決核電反應堆乏燃料帶來的擴散風險
·全球范圍內停止武器級裂變材料生產;逐步淘汰民用高濃鈾使用,清除全球研究機構中武器級鈾庫存并確保其安全處置
·加倍努力化解催生新核國家的地區對抗與沖突
實現無核世界目標還需采取有效措施,遏制任何威脅國家或人民安全的核相關行為。
重申無核世界愿景并采取切實行動,將被視為契合美國道義傳統的重大倡議。這項努力將對子孫后代的安全產生深遠積極影響。缺乏宏偉愿景,具體行動將喪失正當性與緊迫性;缺少實際行動,宏偉愿景將淪為空中樓閣。
我們支持設定無核世界目標,并全力推進實現該目標所需行動,以上述措施為起點。
(由舒爾茨與西德尼·德雷爾博士組織的會議在胡佛研究所召開,重新審視里根與戈爾巴喬夫在雷克雅未克提出的愿景。除舒爾茨與德雷爾博士外,以下人士共同簽署本聲明:馬丁·安德森、史蒂夫·安德烈亞森、邁克爾·阿馬科斯特、威廉·克勞、詹姆斯·古德比、小托馬斯·格雷厄姆、托馬斯·亨里克森、大衛·霍洛威、馬克斯·坎珀爾曼、杰克·馬特洛克、約翰·麥克勞克林、唐·奧伯多弗、羅贊·里奇韋、亨利·羅恩、羅阿爾德·薩格捷耶夫、亞伯拉罕·索費爾)
二、英文
Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage — to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.
Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.
North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium — potentially to weapons grade — highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges.
Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?
Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma — to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said, "The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution."
Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."
Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.
Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles.
What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers.
Strong non-proliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They deserve full implementation. The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially important. They must be energetically pursued.
But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago — the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision shocked experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful weapons.
What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We believe that a major effort should be launched by the United States to produce a positive answer through concrete stages.
First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the disposition of the states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran.
The program on which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat.
·Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
·Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them.
Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.
·Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.
·Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world.
·Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity.
·Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe.
·Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.
Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples.
Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.
We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.
A conference organized by Mr. Shultz and Sidney D. Drell was held at Hoover to reconsider the vision that Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik. In addition to Messrs. Shultz and Drell, the following participants also endorse the view in this statement: Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen, Michael Armacost, William Crowe, James Goodby, Thomas Graham Jr., Thomas Henriksen, David Holloway, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, John McLaughlin, Don Oberdorfer, Rozanne Ridgway, Henry Rowen, Roald Sagdeev and Abraham Sofaer.
三、譯文拾貝
nuclear proliferation
中文解釋:核擴散,指核武器、核技術或核材料向非核武器國家或非國家行為體轉移的現象。根據《不擴散核武器條約》(NPT),締約國承諾防止此類擴散。
英文原句:"preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands"
mutual deterrence
中文解釋:相互威懾,冷戰時期美蘇通過核力量平衡形成的戰略穩定機制,即雙方均擁有摧毀對方的能力,從而避免直接沖突。
英文原句:"the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence"
mutually assured destruction (MAD)
中文解釋:相互確保摧毀,核威懾理論的核心概念,指兩個核大國若爆發戰爭,雙方將遭受不可承受的核報復,從而形成“同歸于盡”的平衡。
英文原句:"old Soviet-American 'mutually assured destruction'"
non-state terrorists
中文解釋:非國家行為體恐怖分子,獨立于主權國家的恐怖組織(如基地組織、ISIS),可能通過非法手段獲取核武器。
英文原句:"non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry"
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
中文解釋:防擴散安全倡議,2003 年由美國發起的多國合作機制,旨在攔截運輸中的核材料與相關技術。
英文原句:"Proliferation Security Initiative and the Additional Protocols"
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
中文解釋:全面禁止核試驗條約,1996 年通過的國際條約,禁止一切核武器試驗,由聯合國監督執行。
英文原句:"ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty"
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
中文解釋:不擴散核武器條約,1968 年生效的國際核裁軍基石,分為核武器國家(NWS)和無核武器國家(NNWS),后者承諾不發展核武器。
英文原句:"The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end"
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program
中文解釋:合作減少威脅計劃,冷戰結束后美俄聯合實施的計劃,旨在銷毀前蘇聯遺留的核武器與材料。
英文原句:"Cooperative Threat Reduction program"
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
中文解釋:全球減少威脅倡議,2004 年啟動的美國計劃,目標是消除全球范圍內的核材料安全隱患。
英文原句:"Global Threat Reduction Initiative"
Additional Protocols
中文解釋:附加議定書,IAEA 核查機制的補充協議,允許對締約國進行更嚴格的突擊檢查。
英文原句:"Additional Protocols are innovative approaches"
fissile material
中文解釋:裂變材料,可用于制造核武器的材料,如鈾 - 235、钚 - 239。
英文原句:"Halting the production of fissile material"
highly enriched uranium (HEU)
中文解釋:高濃縮鈾,鈾 - 235 濃度超過 20% 的鈾材料,可用于核武器或核反應堆。
英文原句:"highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world"
plutonium
中文解釋:钚,人工合成的放射性元素,是核武器的關鍵材料之一。
英文原句:"weapons-usable plutonium"
forward-deployed nuclear weapons
中文解釋:前沿部署核武器,部署在靠近潛在沖突地區的核武器,如冷戰時期美蘇在歐洲部署的中程導彈。
英文原句:"eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed"
Cold War posture
中文解釋:冷戰態勢,指冷戰時期美蘇為應對核戰爭威脅而采取的軍事部署和戰略思維。
英文原句:"changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons"
accidental nuclear use
中文解釋:意外核使用,因技術故障、誤判等非故意因素導致的核武器發射。
英文原句:"reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use"
unauthorized launch
中文解釋:未經授權發射,違反指揮鏈程序的核武器發射行為,可能由內部人員違規操作引發。
英文原句:"prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches"
arms race
中文解釋:軍備競賽,國家間為爭奪軍事優勢而進行的武器數量與質量競爭,如冷戰時期的美蘇核競賽。
英文原句:"turning the arms race on its head"
strategic stability
中文解釋:戰略穩定,通過力量平衡避免核戰爭的狀態,是核威懾理論的核心目標。
英文原句:"maintaining international security during the Cold War"
nuclear disarmament
中文解釋:核裁軍,通過條約或協議減少或消除核武器的過程,如《中導條約》和《新削減戰略武器條約》。
英文原句:"break the logjam on nuclear disarmament"
Atoms for Peace
中文解釋:原子能和平計劃,1953 年艾森豪威爾提出的倡議,主張將核技術用于民用領域以促進國際合作。
英文原句:"Dwight D. Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' address"
joint enterprise
中文解釋:聯合行動,多個國家為共同目標協同開展的國際合作,如當前應對氣候變化的全球行動。
英文原句:"turn the goal into a joint enterprise"
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
中文解釋:核供應國集團,由 48 國組成的非正式組織,制定核材料出口控制準則以防止擴散。
英文原句:"first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group"
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
中文解釋:國際原子能機構,聯合國下屬機構,負責監督核技術和平利用及防擴散核查。
英文原句:"International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)"
spent nuclear fuel
中文解釋:乏核燃料,核反應堆使用后的燃料,仍含有可提取的裂變材料(如钚)。
英文原句:"proliferation issues presented by spent fuel"
civil nuclear commerce
中文解釋:民用核商業,核能在發電、醫療等和平領域的商業應用,需嚴格監管以防止轉用于軍事。
英文原句:"highly enriched uranium in civil commerce"
nuclear research facilities
中文解釋:核研究設施,用于核能開發的實驗室或工廠,如伊朗的納坦茲鈾濃縮廠。
英文原句:"research facilities around the world"
regional confrontations
中文解釋:地區對抗,特定區域內國家間的政治或軍事對立,如印巴在克什米爾的沖突。
英文原句:"resolve regional confrontations and conflicts"
nuclear-related conduct
中文解釋:涉核行為,與核技術相關的活動,包括合法民用與非法軍事用途。
英文原句:"impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct"
moral heritage
中文解釋:道德遺產,國家或文明傳承的倫理價值觀,如美國對自由、民主的倡導。
英文原句:"consistent with America's moral heritage"
security of future generations
中文解釋:后代安全,通過預防性措施保障子孫后代免受核威脅的理念,體現可持續安全觀。
英文原句:"profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations"
joint vision
中文解釋:共同愿景,多個國家對國際秩序或安全目標的共識,如《巴黎協定》中的減排目標。
英文原句:"vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev"
bilateral reductions
中文解釋:雙邊削減,兩個國家通過協議減少核武器數量,如美俄《新削減戰略武器條約》。
英文原句:"significant reductions in deployed nuclear forces"
intermediate-range missiles
中文解釋:中程導彈,射程在 1000-5500 公里的導彈,冷戰時期美蘇《中導條約》將其全面銷毀。
英文原句:"elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles"
technical advances
中文解釋:技術進步,科技發展對核裁軍的推動,如遙感技術提升核查能力。
英文原句:"taking advantage of recent technical advances"
nuclear accident prevention
中文解釋:核事故預防,通過技術手段和管理規范防止核設施事故,如國際核事件分級表(INES)。
英文原句:"step-by-step safeguards to prevent nuclear accidents"
nuclear misjudgment
中文解釋:核誤判,因情報錯誤或戰略誤讀導致的核沖突風險,如古巴導彈危機期間的美蘇對峙。
英文原句:"prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments"
nuclear weapon states (NWS)
中文解釋:核武器國家,根據 NPT 定義,1967 年前擁有核武器的國家(美、俄、中、英、法)。
英文原句:"states that do possess them agree to divest"
non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS)
中文解釋:無核武器國家,NPT 框架下承諾不發展核武器的國家,享有和平利用核能的權利。
英文原句:"non-nuclear weapon states have grown skeptical"
treaty obligations
中文解釋:條約義務,締約國根據國際條約承擔的法律責任,如 NPT 要求核武器國家推進核裁軍。
英文原句:"reaffirmed these treaty obligations"
nuclear deterrence doctrine
中文解釋:核威懾理論,通過展示核報復能力阻止對手攻擊的戰略思想,其有效性依賴于可信性。
英文原句:"shocked experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence"
nuclear danger reduction
中文解釋:核危險降低,通過軍備控制措施減少核戰爭風險,如降低核武器警戒狀態。
英文原句:"steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger"
uranium enrichment process
中文解釋:鈾濃縮過程,通過離心機等技術提高鈾 - 235 濃度的工業流程,可用于民用或軍事目的。
英文原句:"getting control of the uranium enrichment process"
civil nuclear reactors
中文解釋:民用核反應堆,用于發電的核設施,其乏燃料可能被轉用于核武器生產。
英文原句:"uranium for nuclear power reactors"
nuclear fuel cycle
中文解釋:核燃料循環,從鈾礦開采到乏燃料處理的全流程,每個環節都存在擴散風險。
英文原句:"proliferation issues presented by spent fuel"
nuclear security standards
中文解釋:核安全標準,國際原子能機構制定的核材料保護規范,如《核安全公約》。
英文原句:"highest possible standards of security"
nuclear terrorism
中文解釋:核恐怖主義,恐怖組織使用或威脅使用核武器的行為,被列為全球安全的最高威脅之一。
英文原句:"nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation"
nuclear arms control
中文解釋:核軍控,通過條約限制核武器發展,如《限制戰略武器條約》(SALT)。
英文原句:"urgent new actions are taken"
nuclear abolition
中文解釋:廢除核武器,徹底銷毀全球核武器的終極目標,需建立在普遍信任與有效核查之上。
英文原句:"the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether"
Reykjavik summit
中文解釋:雷克雅未克峰會,1986 年里根與戈爾巴喬夫舉行的峰會,首次提出消除核武器的愿景但未達成協議。
英文原句:"aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik"
大外交青年智庫(簡稱“大外交智庫”)(Glory Diplomacy Youth Think-tank,Glory Diplomacy或GDYT)是一家創辦于2017年的以外交安全為主的綜合性戰略研究機構、社會/青年智庫,總部在中國深圳,是深圳首家非官方外交安全智庫、中國首家青年智庫,創始人是王蓋蓋。GDYT一直堅持“只有修煉好內功,才能放心去實戰”的發展理念,從2017年創始初期穩扎穩打,于2018年成立青年原創評論組(于2022年改組為《智本青析》編輯部)并創辦《智本青析》電子刊至今;2019年在海南開設分支機構即海南大外交學會(GDYT HN),同年成立青年發展研究院,該中心在2019年創辦“大外交青年發展與實踐啟航項目”研修班至今,在2021年創辦“世界青年菁英坊《早點知道》講座項目”至今;2020年成立應試就業研究院并創辦《真題解析》付費專欄;同年7月,成立外交外事涉外安全決策咨詢公司,集中研究國家安全與國際安全、海外利益分析與保護、青年外交與青年發展、區域國別與國際組織、跨國公司與全球治理等事務;2021年成立外文編譯評議組并創辦《大譯編參》電子刊至今(該編輯部于2022年創辦《每日信報》微電子日刊),同年成立區域國別研究院(該院于2022年創辦《新國別簡報》欄目);2022年成立世界外交數據中心、全球治理研究院(該院于2022年創辦《鴻士論天下》欄目)、國家安全研究院、黨的理論創新研究中心,并合并所有專訪項目(青坊談、最有影響力人物訪談、21世紀中國外交天團、學人專訪等)整合為《與名人對話》欄目,組建“青年智庫特種部隊”全職高精尖部門(該部門于2023年創辦《中華內參》內刊)和全球范圍內的“大中華菁英圈”(該共同體于2024年創辦《全球統戰》內刊),開啟“Smallibrary·小書屋”全球青年閱讀挑戰計劃(該計劃于2022年創辦《智庫書屋》欄目),運營新知太學(網絡)書院(該書院于2022年創辦《線上共讀》欄目);2023年,成立全球創業研究中心、全球灣區研究院、跨國公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心、數字經濟研究院、海洋治理研究中心、基式外交研究中心,在香港開設分支機構“香港大外交學會(GDYT HK)”,創辦“華灣國際創業發展新菁英匯”國際人才交流平臺,創辦“灣山友(WSY)”戶外爬山徒步讀書研討國際精英俱樂部;2024年,成立新型智庫研究院、企業出海研究院(整合全球創業研究中心、跨國公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心等三大中心于一體)、“荔林讀書會(LOC)”(整合“國關讀書會”“華灣讀書會”“灣山友讀書會”“全球4%讀書會”等四大讀書會于一體)等。GDYT從2021年以來,多次舉辦全國(含全球)青年國際問題學術研討、思想交流、政策分析與企業出海等活動,如“國際問題研究型青年智庫發展模式探索論壇”、“新型國際問題青年智庫建設與發展論壇”、“國際關系青年辯論賽”、“國際關系青年辯論賽最佳辯手論壇”、“世界青年菁英坊《早點知道》系列講座”、“國際問題/區域國別學術研討會(GDYT·ISAS)”系列活動、“《與名人對話》系列采訪活動”、“《鴻士論天下》系列講座活動”、“新時代中國國際戰略高端論壇與菁英論壇”、“華灣國際創業發展新菁英匯”系列活動、“GDYT與國際知名學者對話”、“灣山友俱樂部粵港澳國際精英戶外實踐交流”系列活動、“荔林讀書會”國際前沿思想沙龍等等。自創辦以來,GDYT一直致力于“讓壹億中國大外交青年智慧與方案被全球看見”,聚集全球各地有志青年為實現個人、企業、社會、國家和世界和平發展而奮斗,至2021年底,已發展成集專家顧問、研究員(含高級)、特約研究員(含高級)、助理研究員、編譯評議員、時政評論員、實習生、志愿者等全方位國際人才體系(200人)的樣本標桿青年智庫,聚焦中國與全球大外交領域青年的原創方案、發展計劃和外交延伸等助力與服務,在“對照全球外交發展、對接世界高端智庫、對比新型平臺建設”的三原則指導下,為中國的外交與安全發展貢獻青年力量和方案,為中央及地方政府部門提供內參、為企業國內外發展提供商業咨詢、為國際問題智庫建設提供調研路徑、為非政府組織及個人提供咨詢等服務,被海內外青年譽為現代智囊的“青年精英大腦集中營、集散地”,是全球新型外交青年智庫的開創者和代言人!
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