大外交青年智庫

Glory Diplomacy

讓中國外交青年智慧被全球看見

為中國青年智庫代言

黎巴嫩戰后啟示錄

大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心

作者：亨利?A?基辛格

譯者：大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心

來源：《基式外交研究》2025年第21期“經典文獻重譯”專欄文章

審定：基式外交研究中心學術委員會

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "After Lebanon." The Washington Post, September 13, 2006.

聲明：基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，版權歸原作者所有。如有問題請即刻聯系，如需轉載請注明出處

郵箱：fydwjzhuanyong@126.com

一、中文

當前關于黎巴嫩問題的公共討論中，兩種觀念占據主導地位。其一認為真主黨是游離于法律之外的典型恐怖組織；其二聲稱停火協議標志著黎巴嫩戰爭的終結。這兩種觀點皆與事實相悖。

真主黨實為基地組織模式的癌變擴散。它公然以“國中之國”的姿態運作，在黎巴嫩領土上維持著一支遠超該國正規軍實力的武裝力量，公然藐視兩項聯合國決議。這支由伊朗資助和訓練的軍事化組織，以建制化部隊與強敵展開正面對抗。作為什葉派政黨，其成員在黎巴嫩政府中擔任部長職務，卻自視為不受政府決策約束的特權階層。這種植根于一國領土的非國家實體，具備國家形態的所有特征，并得到地區大國的背書，實為國際關系史上未曾有過的異質現象。

自成立以來，真主黨幾乎持續處于戰爭狀態：1983年襲擊美軍貝魯特軍營致241名海軍陸戰隊員喪生，迫使美國撤出維和部隊，開啟第一輪戰端；2000年通過持續襲擾迫使以色列從黎巴嫩南部撤軍，完成第二輪戰略目標；今夏越境綁架兩名以色列士兵引發以軍報復性打擊，則標志著第三次大規模沖突的爆發。

我們目睹的絕非零星的恐怖襲擊，而是針對主權與領土完整國際準則的精密戰略打擊。真主黨與基地組織的崛起，昭示著跨國效忠正在消解傳統國家認同。驅動這一挑戰的根源，是圣戰主義者堅信現存秩序本身即為非法，其斗爭手段具有天然正當性。在他們眼中，戰場不應受制于其所拒斥的、基于世界秩序原則劃定的國界；被我們視作恐怖的行徑，在他們看來正是瓦解非法政權的戰爭行為。

停火絕非戰爭的終結，而是開啟了更復雜的博弈階段。激進國家與跨國非國家組織（常以民兵形態存在）的合流，構成對全球秩序的雙重沖擊。這種威脅在中東尤具破壞性——該地區國界鮮少體現民族傳統，且成型不足百年。但其蔓延之勢可能波及任何激進伊斯蘭勢力活躍之地。各國領導人因此陷入兩難：既要遵循現行國際秩序原則（其經濟命脈所系），又不得不屈從甚至迎合跨國運動（其政治生存所需）。

黎巴嫩危機恰是這一模式的典型案例。依傳統國際秩序規則，這場戰爭理論上發生在黎巴嫩與以色列兩個國家之間——實則兩國幾乎不存在根本利益沖突。聯合國停火決議明確指出，危機由真主黨挑起，該組織三十年來始終阻止黎巴嫩武裝力量進駐毗鄰以色列的南部地區。但根據現行國際規則，美國國務卿卻不得不與無力執行停火的黎巴嫩政府談判，而真正具備執行能力的實體從未正式接受協議。

黎巴嫩戰爭的真實目標具有跨國屬性，與黎巴嫩國家利益無涉：以對以色列和美國的共同仇恨彌合遜尼派與什葉派千年裂痕；緩解伊朗核計劃面臨的外交壓力；展示以色列在高壓下可能淪為“人質”；確立伊朗在任何談判中的關鍵地位；破壞巴勒斯坦和平進程；證明敘利亞（真主黨第二大支持者）仍具左右黎巴嫩局勢的能力。

評估黎巴嫩戰爭的得失，須著重考量心理政治維度。盡管真主黨遭受重創，但核心心理現實在于：該組織建制完好無損，而以色列既未能（或不愿）遏制對其領土的火箭彈襲擊，亦未能將軍事優勢轉化為戰后談判的政治資本。

關于停火執行的討論，多將傳統準則套用于史無前例的局勢。戰爭主要參與者之一（真主黨）并非停火締約方，且拒絕按聯合國決議要求解除武裝或釋放被綁士兵。本應執行協議的國家態度曖昧——顧忌與伊朗的關系，恐懼本土遭恐襲，以及改善與敘利亞關系的考量（雖次之）。

聯合國駐黎南部臨時部隊（UNIFIL）的授權反映了這種遲疑。科菲·安南秘書長聲明，UNIFIL任務非解除真主黨武裝，而是推動"須通過談判和黎巴嫩國內共識實現的政治進程"。敘利亞宣稱視UNIFIL在邊境部署為敵對行為，聯合國竟予默認。當維和部隊被禁止應對最可能出現的挑戰時，政治進程何以推進？以什葉派為主、裝備陳舊的黎巴嫩軍隊，既無力解除真主黨武裝，亦無法管控敘黎邊境。

更復雜的是，真主黨作為議會政黨和內閣成員，可通過協商決策機制對貝魯特政府的執行行動行使否決權。該組織下一步或通過恐嚇手段掌控政府，利用戰爭積累的聲望操弄民主程序。在此情形下，伊朗與敘利亞在塑造停火規則方面，將比可能因襲擊傷亡而撤出的聯合國部隊更具優勢。

黎巴嫩戰爭徹底改變了以色列的戰略處境。此前，巴以問題雖激烈，仍囿于國家體系傳統原則：以色列合法性、巴勒斯坦建國、邊界劃分、安全安排與和平共處規則。從拉賓“土地換和平”到沙特和平倡議，再到沙龍單邊撤離計劃，“和平進程”始終以國際承認的國家間協議為終極目標。

真主黨及其他拒斥主義勢力正全力阻撓此進程。控制黎南部的真主黨、邊緣化巴勒斯坦權力機構的哈馬斯等圣戰組織，對阿以溫和派的方案嗤之以鼻。他們否認以色列存在的根本權利，而非反對特定邊界劃分。

傳統和平進程現已支離破碎。在遭受加沙與黎巴嫩非國家圣戰者導彈襲擊后，以色列難以繼續視單邊撤軍為和平之路，亦無法找到能擔保安全的合作伙伴。當前以色列政府更無力實施沙龍計劃中從西岸撤離八萬定居者的構想。

持續維持現狀終非長久之計。黎巴嫩戰后亟需新的路線圖支撐全面中東政策。應對非國家極端主義與國家強權政治交織的危機，需要美、歐與溫和阿拉伯國家共同制定統一戰略。唯此方能促使被占領土上出現接受和平共處的領導力量。

所有問題最終指向伊朗的挑戰：培植黎巴嫩“國中之國”真主黨、資助伊拉克“國中之國”薩德爾武裝、推進核武計劃（將引發核擴散失控，為系統性破壞區域秩序提供保護傘），當前挑戰已超越既有框架內的調整，直指世界秩序存續。

構建由溫和阿拉伯國家支持的大西洋共同政策刻不容緩——無論既往合作經驗多么令人沮喪。伊拉克戰爭引發的“美國魯莽 vs 歐洲逃避”的爭論，與當前全球面臨的危機相比已微不足道。大西洋兩岸必須集思廣益，應對核武裝中東背景下“更廣泛戰爭演變為文明沖突”的共同威脅，而非糾結于安理會決議的臨時磋商。這不能通過安理會決議的臨時討價還價實現，而應讓決議產生于共識戰略。

許多國家比美國政府對外交前景（尤其對伊朗）更顯樂觀。我們應傾聽這些聲音，認真探索化解對抗的路徑。但歐洲盟友需明確：此進程不應受國內政治或輿論壓力驅使，須設定外交靈活性的底線與時限，防止談判淪為新一輪襲擊的掩護。

黎巴嫩危機中已顯現合作曙光：歐洲與美國達成足夠共識，美國也充分關注歐洲關切，美歐在安理會達成協調外交，并為黎南部部署重要維和力量。

這種合作能否在新階段持續，特別是聯合國在黎巴嫩的努力能否成為應對危機的手段而非回避決策的工具，在即將到來的伊朗談判中尤為關鍵。自蘇聯解體以來，有識之士始終質疑：缺乏共同威脅認知的大西洋紐帶能否維系？如今我們深知：構建新世界秩序已非選擇，而是避免全球災難的必然要求。這非大西洋任何一方可獨力完成。共同的危機認知能否重燃使命共識？歷史正在等待答案。

二、英文

Two conceptions dominate public discussion on Lebanon. The first is that Hezbollah is a traditional terrorist organization operating covertly outside the law. The second is that the cease-fire marks an end to the war in Lebanon. Neither conception is valid.

Hezbollah is, in fact, a metastasization of the al-Qaeda pattern. It acts openly as a state within a state. It commands an army much stronger and far better equipped than Lebanon's, on Lebanese soil, in defiance of two U.N. resolutions. Financed and trained by Iran, it fights wars with organized units against a major adversary. As a Shiite party, it has ministers in the government of Lebanon who do not consider themselves bound by its decisions. A non-state entity on the soil of a state, with all the attributes of a state and backed by the major regional power, is a new phenomenon in international relations.

Since its creation, Hezbollah has been almost permanently at war. The first of three Hezbollah wars occurred when, in 1983, its attack on U.S. barracks killed 241 Marines and caused America to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from Beirut. The second was a campaign of harassment that induced Israeli forces to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000. The third was inaugurated this year with the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers inside Israel that led to the Israeli retaliatory attack.

We are witnessing a carefully conceived assault, not isolated terrorist attacks, on the international system of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The creation of organizations such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda symbolizes the fact that transnational loyalties are replacing national ones. The driving force behind this challenge is the jihadist conviction that it is the existing order that is illegitimate, not the Hezbollah and jihad method of fighting it. For the jihad's adherents, the battlefield cannot be defined by frontiers based on principles of world order they reject; what we call terror is, to the jihadists, an act of war to undermine illegitimate regimes.

A cease-fire does not end this war; it inaugurates a new phase in it. This twin assault on the global order, by the combination of radical states with transnational non-state groups sometimes organized as militias, is a particular challenge in the Middle East, where frontiers denote few national traditions and are not yet a century old. But it could spread to wherever militant, radical Islamic groups exist. Leaders therefore are torn between following the principles of the existing international order, on which their economies may depend, and yielding to (if not joining) the transnational movements on which their political survival may depend.

The crisis in Lebanon is a classic case of that pattern. By the rules of the old international order, the war technically took place between two states – Lebanon and Israel – that in fact have very few conflicting interests. The U.N. cease-fire resolution affirms that the crisis was provoked by Hezbollah, which had kept the Lebanese armed forces out of the southern part of Lebanon facing Israel for 30 years. Yet, by existing international rules, the U.S. secretary of state was obliged to negotiate on the cease-fire with the Lebanese government, which controlled no forces in a position to implement it, while the only forces capable of doing so have never formally accepted it.

The real goals of the Lebanese war were transnational, not Lebanese: to overcome the millennia-old split between Sunnis and Shiites on the basis of hatred for Israel and America; to relieve diplomatic pressure on Iran's nuclear program; to demonstrate that Israel would be held hostage if pressure became too acute; to establish Iran as a major factor in any negotiation; to scuttle the Palestinian peace process; to show that Syria – the second major sponsor of Hezbollah – remained in a position to pursue its ambitions in Lebanon.

This is why the balance sheet of the war in Lebanon must be assessed in large part in psychological and political terms. No doubt the war inflicted heavy casualties on Hezbollah. The overriding psychological reality, however, is that Hezbollah remained intact and that Israel proved unable (or unwilling) either to suppress the rocket attacks on its territory or to gear its military power to political objectives capable of providing bargaining positions after the cessation of hostilities.

Much of the discussion over observance of the cease-fire applies traditional verities to an unprecedented situation. One of the principals in the war is not a party to the cease-fire and has refused either to disarm or to release the two Israeli prisoners it kidnapped, as called for in the U.N. resolution. The countries needed to enforce the agreement have been ambivalent because of the importance they attach to relations with Iran, their fear of terrorist attacks on their own territory and, to a lesser extent, their interest in improving relations with Syria.

The mandate for the U.N. force in southern Lebanon reflects these hesitations. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has declared that the mission of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon is not to disarm Hezbollah but to encourage a political process that, in his words, "has to be achieved through negotiation, and an internal Lebanese consensus, a political process, for which the new [force] is not, and cannot be, a substitute." Syria has declared that it would consider the deployment of UNIFIL forces along its borders a hostile act, and the United Nations has acquiesced. How is the political process going to work when the U.N. force is precluded from dealing with the most probable challenges? The Lebanese army – composed largely of Shiites and armed with obsolescent weapons – is in no position to disarm Hezbollah or to control the Syrian border.

To compound these complexities, Hezbollah, as a political party, participates in the Lebanese parliament and, on the ministerial level, in the central government. Both institutions generally make decisions by consensus. Hezbollah thus has at least a blocking veto on those issues on which the cooperation of the Beirut government is needed for enforcement.

Hezbollah's next move is likely to be an attempt to dominate the Beirut government by intimidation and, using the prestige gained in the war, manipulating democratic procedures. In such a situation, Iran and Syria will be in a stronger position to shape the rules of the cease-fire than the U.N. forces, which – as experience shows – are likely to be withdrawn when terrorist attacks inflict casualties. The challenge for American policy and all concerned with world order is to recognize that the cease-fire requires purposeful management. A principal objective must be to prevent rearmament of Hezbollah or its domination of the Lebanese political process. Otherwise, the U.N. force will provide a shield for creating the conditions for another, even more dangerous, explosion.

The war in Lebanon has transformed the position of Israel dramatically. Heretofore the Palestinian issue has, for all its intensity, been about traditional principles of the state system: the legitimacy of Israel; the creation of a Palestinian state; the drawing of borders between these entities; the security arrangement and rules for peaceful coexistence. From Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's "land for peace" formula, to Saudi Arabia's offer of peace and mutual recognition, to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's concept of unilateral withdrawal from occupied territories, the so-called peace process was conceived as culminating in an internationally accepted peace agreement between internationally recognized states.

Hezbollah and other rejectionist groups are determined to prevent precisely this evolution. Hezbollah, which took over southern Lebanon, and Hamas and various jihadist groups, which marginalized the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, disdain the schemes of moderate Arab and Israeli leaders. They reject the very existence of Israel, not any particular set of borders.

One of the consequences is that the traditional peace process is now a shambles. After being attacked with missiles from both Gaza and Lebanon launched by non-state jihadists, Israel will find it difficult to view unilateral withdrawal as a road to peace, nor will it be able under current conditions to find a partner to guarantee security. Finally, in the aftermath of Lebanon, the current Israeli government lacks the authority or public support to withdraw even the 80,000 settlers from the West Bank envisaged in the Sharon plan.

At the same time, an indefinite continuation of the status quo is not sustainable. Some new road map must emerge to underpin the comprehensive Mideast policy that must follow the Lebanon war. To deal with the crisis produced by the combination of non-state fanaticism and state power politics, a joint project among the United States, Europe and the moderate Arab states is needed to work out a common approach. Only in this manner can a leadership accepting peaceful coexistence emerge in the occupied territories.

Everything returns to the challenge of Iran. It trains, finances and equips Hezbollah, the state within a state in Lebanon. It finances and supports Moqtada al-Sadr's militia, the state within a state in Iraq. It works on a nuclear weapons program, which would drive nuclear proliferation out of control and provide a safety net for the systematic destruction of at least the regional order. The challenge is now about world order more than about adjustments within an accepted framework.

A common Atlantic policy backed by moderate Arab states must become a top priority, no matter how pessimistic previous experience with such projects leaves one. The debate sparked by the Iraq war over American rashness versus European escapism is dwarfed by what the world now faces. Both sides of the Atlantic should put their best minds together on how to deal with the common danger of a wider war merging into a war of civilizations against the background of a nuclear-armed Middle East. This cannot be done through ad hoc bargaining over Security Council resolutions; rather, the Security Council resolutions should emerge from an agreed strategy.

Many of the countries in such a grouping have a more optimistic view about the prospects of diplomacy – especially with Iran – than the U.S. administration. We should be open to these concerns and be prepared to join a serious exploration of prospects for turning away from confrontation. But the European allies need to accept the idea that this process should not be driven by domestic politics or media pressure. It has to include a bottom line beyond which diplomatic flexibility cannot go and a time limit to prevent negotiations from turning into a shield for developing new assaults.

In the Lebanon crisis, one can detect the beginning of such a process. Europe shared enough of the American perception and America paid enough attention to European concerns to produce a coordinated diplomacy in the Security Council and to supply a significant peacekeeping force for southern Lebanon.

It remains to be seen whether this cooperation can be sustained in the next phase, specifically whether the U.N. effort in Lebanon can become a means to deal with the dangers outlined here or become a way to avoid the necessary decisions. This is even more true of the impending Iran negotiations. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, thoughtful observers have wondered whether the Atlantic ties can be maintained in the absence of a commonly perceived danger. We now know that we face the imperative of building a new world order or potential global catastrophe. It cannot be done alone by either side of the Atlantic. Is that realization sufficient to regenerate a sense of common purpose?

三、譯文拾貝

Metastasization of the al-Qaeda pattern

中文解釋：基地組織模式的擴散（引申為恐怖主義組織的結構性復制與跨國滲透）

原句語境："Hezbollah is, in fact, a metastasization of the al-Qaeda pattern."

State within a state

中文解釋：國中之國（國際法框架下的非國家實體，行使準國家職能）

原句語境："It acts openly as a state within a state."

U.N. resolutions

中文解釋：聯合國決議（安理會 / 大會通過的具有政治約束力的國際文件）

原句語境："in defiance of two U.N. resolutions."

Transnational non-state groups

中文解釋：跨國非國家集團（超越國界的政治軍事組織）

原句語境："radical states with transnational non-state groups sometimes organized as militias."

Jihadist conviction

中文解釋：圣戰主義信念（主張通過暴力建立伊斯蘭秩序的宗教政治意識形態）

原句語境："The driving force behind this challenge is the jihadist conviction that it is the existing order that is illegitimate."

Illegitimate regimes

中文解釋：非法政權（基于宗教或意識形態標準判定的非正當統治實體）

原句語境："undermine illegitimate regimes."

Principles of world order

中文解釋：世界秩序原則（主權、領土完整等構成的國際體系基礎）

原句語境："principles of world order they reject."

Cease-fire resolution

中文解釋：停火決議（聯合國主導的沖突終止協議）

原句語境："The U.N. cease-fire resolution affirms that the crisis was provoked by Hezbollah."

Blocking veto

中文解釋：否決權（通過阻礙共識達成的政治博弈手段）

原句語境："Hezbollah thus has at least a blocking veto on those issues."

Transnational loyalties

中文解釋：跨國忠誠（超越民族國家認同的意識形態歸屬）

原句語境："transnational loyalties are replacing national ones."

Militias

中文解釋：民兵組織（非國家正規武裝力量）

原句語境："organized as militias."

Existing international order

中文解釋：現行國際秩序（二戰后建立的以主權國家為核心的全球治理體系）

原句語境："principles of the existing international order."

Diplomatic pressure

中文解釋：外交壓力（通過政治孤立、制裁等手段迫使政策改變）

原句語境："to relieve diplomatic pressure on Iran's nuclear program."

Palestinian peace process

中文解釋：巴勒斯坦和平進程（旨在解決巴以沖突的多邊談判框架）

原句語境："to scuttle the Palestinian peace process."

Psychological and political terms

中文解釋：心理與政治層面（沖突評估的雙重維度）

原句語境："assessed in large part in psychological and political terms."

Disarm

中文解釋：解除武裝（終止非國家實體的軍事能力）

原句語境："refused either to disarm or to release the two Israeli prisoners."

U.N. force

中文解釋：聯合國部隊（國際維和行動的軍事力量）

原句語境："the mandate for the U.N. force in southern Lebanon reflects these hesitations."

Syrian border

中文解釋：敘利亞邊境（黎巴嫩與敘利亞的爭議邊界）

原句語境："control the Syrian border."

Consensus

中文解釋：共識（政治決策中的全體一致原則）

原句語境："Both institutions generally make decisions by consensus."

Intimidation

中文解釋：恐嚇（通過暴力威脅影響政治進程）

原句語境："dominate the Beirut government by intimidation."

Democratic procedures

中文解釋：民主程序（選舉、議會辯論等制度性政治機制）

原句語境："manipulating democratic procedures."

Rearmament

中文解釋：重新武裝（恢復軍事能力的過程）

原句語境："prevent rearmament of Hezbollah."

Security arrangement

中文解釋：安全安排（保障地區穩定的多邊協議）

原句語境："the security arrangement and rules for peaceful coexistence."

Land for peace

中文解釋：以土地換和平（通過領土讓步換取安全保障的外交策略）

原句語境："Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's 'land for peace' formula."

Unilateral withdrawal

中文解釋：單邊撤軍（單方面改變領土現狀的軍事行動）

原句語境："Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's concept of unilateral withdrawal from occupied territories."

Rejectionist groups

中文解釋：拒絕主義團體（反對現有政治解決方案的激進組織）

原句語境："Hezbollah and other rejectionist groups are determined to prevent precisely this evolution."

Palestinian Authority

中文解釋：巴勒斯坦民族權力機構（巴勒斯坦自治政府）

原句語境："marginalized the Palestinian Authority in Gaza."

Status quo

中文解釋：現狀（維持現有政治軍事格局）

原句語境："an indefinite continuation of the status quo is not sustainable."

Road map

中文解釋：路線圖（分階段實現政治目標的行動計劃）

原句語境："Some new road map must emerge to underpin the comprehensive Mideast policy."

Atlantic ties

中文解釋：大西洋聯盟關系（歐美跨大西洋伙伴關系）

原句語境："the Atlantic ties can be maintained in the absence of a commonly perceived danger."

Global catastrophe

中文解釋：全球災難（核擴散、大規模戰爭等威脅人類生存的危機）

原句語境："potential global catastrophe."

Common purpose

中文解釋：共同目標（國際社會協調行動的基礎）

原句語境："regenerate a sense of common purpose."

Nuclear proliferation

中文解釋：核擴散（核武器技術向非核國家傳播）

原句語境："drive nuclear proliferation out of control."

Regional order

中文解釋：地區秩序（特定地理區域內的權力結構）

原句語境："systematic destruction of at least the regional order."

Ad hoc bargaining

中文解釋：臨時討價還價（缺乏戰略框架的應急談判）

原句語境："cannot be done through ad hoc bargaining over Security Council resolutions."

Security Council resolutions

中文解釋：安理會決議（聯合國最高級別國際決議）

原句語境："Security Council resolutions should emerge from an agreed strategy."

Diplomatic flexibility

中文解釋：外交靈活性（談判中調整立場的策略空間）

原句語境："a bottom line beyond which diplomatic flexibility cannot go."

Time limit

中文解釋：時間限制（防止談判拖延的機制）

原句語境："a time limit to prevent negotiations from turning into a shield."

Peacekeeping force

中文解釋：維和部隊（聯合國監督停火的軍事存在）

原句語境："supply a significant peacekeeping force for southern Lebanon."

Iran negotiations

中文解釋：伊朗談判（解決伊朗核問題的多邊外交努力）

原句語境："even more true of the impending Iran negotiations."

Coordinated diplomacy

中文解釋：協調外交（多國聯合制定的外交策略）

原句語境："produce a coordinated diplomacy in the Security Council."

Moderate Arab states

中文解釋：溫和阿拉伯國家（主張通過對話解決爭端的阿拉伯政權）

原句語境："moderate Arab states."

Security net

中文解釋：安全屏障（防止危機擴散的保障機制）

原句語境："provide a safety net for the systematic destruction."

Shields for developing new assaults

中文解釋：為新襲擊提供掩護（利用談判拖延時間準備軍事行動）

原句語境："prevent negotiations from turning into a shield for developing new assaults."

Military power

中文解釋：軍事力量（國家或組織的武裝能力）

原句語境："gear its military power to political objectives."

Bargaining positions

中文解釋：談判地位（影響協議內容的實力基礎）

原句語境："providing bargaining positions after the cessation of hostilities."

Hostile act

中文解釋：敵對行為（國際法認定的戰爭行為）

原句語境："Syria has declared that it would consider the deployment a hostile act."

Obsolescent weapons

中文解釋：過時武器（技術落后于時代的軍事裝備）

原句語境："armed with obsolescent weapons."

Internal Lebanese consensus

中文解釋：黎巴嫩內部共識（各政治派別達成的基本政治協議）

原句語境："encourage a political process ... through negotiation, and an internal Lebanese consensus."

Transnational jihadists

中文解釋：跨國圣戰分子（超越國界的宗教極端武裝分子）

原句語境："attacked with missiles from both Gaza and Lebanon launched by non-state jihadists."

大外交青年智庫（簡稱“大外交智庫”）（Glory Diplomacy Youth Think-tank，Glory Diplomacy或GDYT）是一家創辦于2017年的以外交安全為主的綜合性戰略研究機構、社會/青年智庫，總部在中國深圳，是深圳首家非官方外交安全智庫、中國首家青年智庫，創始人是王蓋蓋。GDYT一直堅持“只有修煉好內功，才能放心去實戰”的發展理念，從2017年創始初期穩扎穩打，于2018年成立青年原創評論組（于2022年改組為《智本青析》編輯部）并創辦《智本青析》電子刊至今；2019年在海南開設分支機構即海南大外交學會，同年成立青年發展研究中心，該中心在2019年創辦“大外交青年發展與實踐啟航項目”研修班至今，在2021年創辦“世界青年菁英坊《早點知道》講座項目”至今；2020年成立應試就業研究中心并創辦《真題解析》付費專欄；同年7月，成立外交外事涉外安全決策咨詢公司，集中研究國家安全與國際安全、海外利益分析與保護、青年外交與青年發展、區域國別與國際組織、跨國公司與全球治理等事務；2021年成立外文編譯評議組并創辦《大譯編參》電子刊至今（該編輯部于2022年創辦《每日信報》微電子日刊），同年成立區域國別研究中心（該中心于2022年創辦《新國別簡報》欄目）；2022年成立世界外交數據中心、全球治理研究中心（該中心于2022年創辦《鴻士論天下》欄目）、國家安全研究中心、黨的理論創新研究中心，并合并所有專訪項目（青坊談、最有影響力人物訪談、21世紀中國外交天團、學人專訪等）整合為《與名人對話》欄目，組建“青年智庫特種部隊”全職高精尖部門和全球范圍內的“大中華菁英圈”，開啟“Smallibrary·小書屋”全球青年閱讀挑戰計劃（該計劃于2022年創辦《智庫書屋》欄目），運營新知太學（網絡）書院（該書院于2022年創辦《線上共讀》欄目）；2023年，成立全球創業研究中心、全球灣區研究中心、跨國公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心、數字經濟研究中心、海洋治理研究中心、基式外交研究中心，在香港開設分支機構“香港大外交學會（GDYT HK）”，創辦“華灣國際創業發展新菁英匯”國際人才交流平臺，創辦灣區爬山書友俱樂部等。GDYT從2021年以來，多次舉辦全國（含全球）青年國際問題學術研討、政策分析與思想交流等活動，如“國際問題研究型青年智庫發展模式探索論壇”、“新型國際問題青年智庫建設與發展論壇”、“國際關系青年辯論賽”、“國際關系青年辯論賽最佳辯手論壇”、“世界青年菁英坊《早點知道》系列講座”、“國際問題/區域國別學術研討會（GDYT·ISAS）”系列活動、“《與名人對話》系列采訪活動”、“《鴻士論天下》系列講座活動”、“新時代中國國際戰略高端論壇與菁英論壇”、“華灣國際創業發展新菁英匯”系列活動、“GDYT與國際知名學者對話”等等。自創辦以來，GDYT一直致力于“讓壹億中國大外交青年智慧與方案被全球看見”，聚集全球各地有志青年為實現個人、企業、社會、國家和世界和平發展而奮斗，至2021年底，已發展成集專家顧問、研究員（含高級）、特約研究員（含高級）、助理研究員、編譯評議員、時政評論員、實習生、志愿者等全方位國際人才體系（200人）的樣本標桿青年智庫，聚焦中國與全球大外交領域青年的原創方案、發展計劃和外交延伸等助力與服務，在“對照全球外交發展、對接世界高端智庫、對比新型平臺建設”的三原則指導下，為中國的外交與安全發展貢獻青年力量和方案，為政府、企業、智庫、高校、非政府組織以及個人都有提供過咨詢服務，被海內外青年譽為現代智囊的“青年精英大腦集散地”，是全球新型外交青年智庫的開創者和代言人！

大外交青年智庫

Glory Diplomacy

讓中國外交青年智慧被全球看見

為中國青年智庫代言